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INTRODUCTION 
  
[1]  The perceived need for part-human materials – considered to be 
biological materials containing human genetic material for the purposes of 
this paper – is at least twofold.1  First, given the continued shortage of 
human organs and other human biological materials suitable for 
transplantation, thousands of persons will suffer illness and death each 
year.2  While xenotransplantation – the transplantation, implantation, or 
infusion into a human recipient of cells, tissues, or organs from a non-
                                                 
∗
 Gregory R. Hagen is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Calgary.  
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 Sébastien A. Gittens is articling at Bennett Jones LLP in Calgary.  
1
 The category of part-human therefore includes both animal-human combinations as well 
as stages of development of humans or animal-human combinations from embryo to 
maturity.  The reason for defining “part- human” in terms of genetic make-up in the 
context of this paper is because close genetic matching decreases the rejection of 
transplanted material.  Defined in this way, “part-human” encompasses human 
combinations that cross species boundaries, human beings at all stages of development, 
animal-human stem cells, and stem cells that contain both human and non-human DNA.  
2
 For statistics, see infra at § I.  The shortage of organs is so severe that the World Health 
Organization has recently expressed its concern over the development of “transplant 
tourism,” the purchasing of organs from live donors in developing countries.  See World 
Health Organization, Who Proposes Global Agenda on Transplantation (2007), available 
at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/ 2007/pr12/en/index.html. 
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human animal source – has been occurring in some fashion for hundreds 
of years, it often results in rejection by the recipient’s immune system.3  In 
order to minimize the rejection of xenotransplants, the possibility of using 
part-human organs, tissues and cells, such as pig hearts containing human 
DNA, for transplantation is actively being explored.4  Second, research 
using human embryonic stem cells could assist in developing treatments 
for diseases and in discovering new pharmaceuticals.5  However, given the 
limited availability of human eggs used to create human embryonic stem 
cells and the ethical controversies associated with the harvesting of human 
eggs and the destruction of human embryos, it has been suggested that 
part-human stem cells be used for research purposes.6 
 
[2]  Because of the perceived need for part-human biotechnological 
material and the fact that patents on such subject matter would provide an 
incentive for its production, one would expect that it would be patentable.  
But, because of moral concerns associated with the creation of part-
humans, such as the devaluation of humanity, the potential creation of new 
diseases that could afflict humans, and animal suffering, legislation has 
been enacted in some jurisdictions prohibiting the creation and/or use of 
                                                 
3
 For discussion of the history of xenotransplantation, see Jack-Yves Deschamps, et al., 
History of Xenotransplantation, 12 XENOTRANSPLANTATION 91 (2005).  For current 
xenotransplantation practice and the problem of immune system rejection of xenografts, 
see Ashley Cox & Robert Zhong, Current Advances in Xenotransplantation, 4 
HEPATOBILIARY PANCREAT DIS. INT. 490 (2005) and Brenda M. Ogle & Jeffrey L. Platt, 
Xenografts, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOMATERIALS AND BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 1780 
(Gary E. Wnek & Gary L. Bowlin eds., 2004).  Xenotransplantation also includes the 
transplantation, implantation, or infusion into a human recipient of human body fluids, 
cells, tissues or organs that have had ex vivo contact with live non-human animal cells, 
tissues, or organs.  For the definition of “xenotransplantation,” see U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, Xenotransplantation Action Plan (2001), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/xap/xap.htm#back. 
4
 Jeffrey L. Platt, Fusion of Approaches to the Treatment of Organ Failure, 4 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANT 74 (2004). 
5
 See, e.g., STEM CELL AND GENE-BASED THERAPY: FRONTIERS IN REGENERATIVE 
MEDICINE (Alexander Battler & Jonathan Leor eds., 2006); Hannes Hentze et al., Cell 
Therapy and the Safety of Embryonic Stem Cell-Derived Grafts, 25 TRENDS BIOTECH. 24 
(2007). 
6
 United Kingdom Parliament, Select Committee on Science and Technology, Fifth 
Report (2007), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmsctech/272/27206.htm#
n113. 
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some part-human subject matter.7  Where this has occurred, patents either 
cannot be granted on such subject matter or, if they can be granted, cannot 
be exploited without violating the law.8  Furthermore, even in cases where 
the creation and/or use of part-human materials is not prohibited, residual 
uncertainty exists regarding whether, and in which cases, patents can be 
granted on part-human materials.    
                                                 
7
 For an informed ethical discussion that sets out some of the ethical objections to the 
creation of part-human materials, see Scottish Council on Human Bioethics, Embryonic, 
Fetal and Post-Natal Animal-Human Mixtures: An Ethical Discussion (2005), available 
at http://www.schb.org.uk/, and BioCentre: The Centre for Bioethics and Public Policy, 
The New Inter-Species Future? An Ethical Discussion of Embryonic, Fetal and Post 
Natal Human-Nonhuman Combinations (2007), available at 
http://www.bioethics.ac.uk/index.php?do=topic&sid=13.  As for legislation, in Canada, 
the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2004 S.C., ch. 2, § 5(1)(i) prohibits the knowing 
creation of a chimera, or the transplantation of a chimera into either a human being or a 
non-human life form.  For further discussion and clarification, see Françoise Baylis, 
Betwixt and Between Human Stem Cell Guidelines and Legislation, 11 HEALTH L. REV. 
44 (2002) and Sylvie Bordet et al., Legal Aspects of Animal-Human Combinations in 
Canada, 1MCGILL HEALTH L. PUB. (2007), available at 
http://mhlp.mcgill.ca/texts/volume1/pdf/bordet-feldman-knoppers.pdf.  For an analysis of 
U.S. law as well as a moral framework for the regulation of animal-human combinations, 
see Stephen Munzer, Human-Non Human Chimera in Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 21 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2007) available at 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v21/MUNZER_Human-Nonhuman_Chimeras.pdf.  
For a comparison of Canadian and U.S. law on mixed species, see Nicole E. Kopinski, 
Comment, Human-NonHuman Chimera: A Regulatory Proposal on the Blurring of 
Species Lines, 45 B.C. L. REV. 667 (2004).  Some European countries, such as Denmark, 
France, and Germany prohibit the mixing of human gametes with the live gametes of 
other animals, but in the U.K. such activity is licensed under the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, 1990 c. 37.  For a review of European policy on stem cell research, see 
Rosario M. Isasi & Bartha Maria Knoppers, Mind the Gap: Policy Approaches to 
Embryonic Stem Cell and Cloning Research in 50 Countries, 13 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 9 
(2006).  For a general overview of stem cell policies, see The Hinxton Group, World 
Stem Cell Policies, http://www.hinxtongroup.org/wp_am_exc.html#us (last visited July 
3, 2007).  
8
 In Canada, § 42 of the Patent Act explicitly provides positive rights to the patentee: “the 
exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention and 
selling it to others to be used . . . ” subject, of course, to other laws that prohibited the 
exercise of such rights.  Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4 (2005).  Hence, in Canada, where 
there are regulations prohibiting the making, constructing, use, or sale of a particular 
technology, it may not be lawful to grant a patent right to that technology.  Where patent 
rights are negative rights, as in the United States, it is not necessarily inconsistent to grant 
a patent right to some technology where there is a regulation prohibiting its making, 
constructing, using, or selling.  
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[3]  The use of inherently vague biological concepts – such as human and 
higher life forms – make it difficult to determine in a non-arbitrary, 
consistent, and predictable way when material containing human DNA is 
patentable.  For example, despite intense opposition to the patenting of 
human genetic material,9 in Canada, the United States, and Europe, 
isolated human elements, including nucleotide sequences, are generally 
eligible for patenting.10  At the same time, however, one cannot patent a 
human being in any of these jurisdictions.11  The difficulty occurs in 
intermediary cases, such as determining the amount of human DNA that is 
required to make a part-human organ grown in a sheep unpatentable.  A 
second illustration concerns the Canadian rule that higher life forms are 
not patentable but lower life forms are patentable.12  Unicellular organisms 
are traditionally classified as lower life forms in Canada while 
multicellular organisms are considered to be higher life forms.13  Further, 
every stage of development of a higher life form from fertilized egg on is 
                                                 
9
 For example, see John Sulston, Heritage of Humanity, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE 
(2002), available at http://mondediplo.com/2002/12/15genome.  John Sulston was the 
2002 recipient of the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine and a major contributor to 
the mapping of the human genome.  See also, Kevin E. Noonan, The Continuing Threat 
to Human Gene Patenting, PATENT DOCS, Oct. 16, 2007, available at 
http://www.patentdocs.net/patent_docs/2007/10/the-continuing-.html (discussing the 
recent attempt to amend U.S. patent legislation to prohibit patenting human genetic 
material).  
10
 See United States Patent and Trademark Office Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 
Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001); CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE (2007) available at 
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/patents/mopop-e.html; Council Directive 98/44, 
art. 5(2), 1998 O.J. (L 213) (Biotechnology Directive).  For an analysis, see DAVID 
CAMPBELL & STÉPHANE BERGERON, STUDY ON THE BREADTH OF HUMAN GENE PATENTS 
GRANTED BY THE CIPO, THE EPO, AND THE USPTO: SCIENCE METRIX FINAL REPORT 
(2005), available at http://cbac-cccb.ca/epic/site/cbac-cccb.nsf/en/h_ah00128e.html; E. 
Richard Gold, Patents in Genes (2000), available at http://cbac-cccb.ca/epic/site/cbac-
cccb.nsf/en/ah00419e.html#genes.  The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has produced a 
useful list of the kinds of DNA-related patents that exist.  THE NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON 
BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA: A DISCUSSION PAPER (2002), available at 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf.  
11
 Of the three jurisdictions discussed herein, only Europe prohibits the patenting of 
humans explicitly under legislation.  See infra, §IV. 
12
 Harvard C. v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 2002 SCC 76 ¶ 158 (Can.) (“Harvard 
College”). 
13
 CIPO, MANUAL, supra note 10, at § 12.04. 
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considered to be a higher life form in Canada.14  Hence, a fertilized animal 
egg has been determined to be unpatentable in Canada notwithstanding 
that it is a single cell – thus contradicting the principle that lower life 
forms are patentable.15  
 
[4]  This paper is not intended to be a survey of the patentability of 
biotechnology generally,16 of the ethics and law regarding the creation, 
use, and patenting of part-human biological materials,17 or of the ethics 
and law of xenotransplantation as a medical procedure.18  Nor does it take 
a position on the issue of whether ethical concerns are relevant to the 
patentability of subject matter in addition to whether the subject matter at 
issue is new, useful, and inventive.  Rather, its more limited aim is to 
discuss the uncertain application of the biological criteria that are 
currently used in the United States, Canada, and Europe to distinguish 
                                                 
14
 CIPO, OFFICE PRACTICE REGARDING FERTILIZED EGGS, STEM CELLS, ORGANS AND 
TISSUES (2006), available at 
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/patents/notice_jun20_06-e.html.   
15
 Id. 
16
 See, e.g., GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE 
SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: A TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORY (2003); and DANIEL J. KEVLES, 
A HISTORY OF PATENTING LIFE IN THE U.S. WITH COMPARATIVE ATTENTION TO EUROPE 
AND CANADA (European Commission 2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/publications/docs/study_kevles_en.pdf; 
OLIVER MILLS, BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS: MORAL RESTRAINTS AND PATENT LAW 
(2005). 
17
 Jerzy Koopman, The Patentability of Transgenic Animals in the U.S. of America and 
the European Union: A Proposal for Harmonization, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 103 (2002) (comparing U.S. and European law on the patentability of 
transgenic animals).  For the ethics of creating part-human materials, see Jason Scott 
Robert & Françoise Baylis, Crossing Species Boundaries, 3 AM. J. BIOETH. 1, 1-2 (2003), 
and accompanying commentaries.  
18
 For a systematic account of the law and ethics of xenotransplantation, see SHEILA A.M. 
MCLEAN & LAURA WILLIAMSON, XENOTRANSPLANTATION (2005) and Melanie J. 
Mortensen, In the Shadow of Doctor Moreau: A Contextual Reading of the Proposed 
Canadian Standard for Xenotransplantation, 2 U. O. L. T. J. 37, 46 (2005) (expressing 
the, perhaps, overly-cautious view, that “[x]enotransplantation ought to remain a distant 
possibility until the risks are better appreciated and the technology is fully regulated on a 
truly international scale.”).  The Nuffield Council on Bioethics said in contrast that “once 
all the necessary safeguards have been set in place, xenotransplantation may be offered to 
suitable patients.”  THE NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, ANIMAL-TO-HUMAN 
TRANSPLANTS: THE ETHICS OF XENOTRANSPLANTATION (1996), available at 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/xenotransplantation.pdf. 
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between patentable and unpatentable subject matter, particularly, part-
human materials that could be used for transplantation.  
 
[5]  Section I motivates the discussion by describing the shortage of 
human materials for transplantation and research and the potential use of 
part-human materials to satisfy that need.  Section II offers a brief 
overview of the science and technology of part-human biological 
materials, focusing on chimeric and transgenic biological materials, as 
well as part-human stem cells.  Section III introduces the problem of 
providing a principled distinction between patentable part-humans and 
unpatentable part-humans and, in Canada, the distinction between 
patentable lower life forms and unpatentable higher life forms.  Section III 
then argues that the vagueness of the concepts of biological human and 
higher life form prevents a principled basis for distinguishing between 
those part-humans that are patentable from those that are not in a way that 
is consistent with current patent office practice.  A replacement rule is 
presented that prohibits the patenting of reflective, rational agents – that is, 
persons – whether human or not.19  Finally, Section IV compares the 
patentability of part-human biological material in the United States, 
Canada, and Europe.  It also identifies some of the obstacles to 
implementing a rule against patenting persons in the United States, 
Canada and Europe.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. HUMAN MATERIALS FOR TRANSPLANTATION & MEDICAL RESEARCH 
 
[6]  The primary need for human biological materials is for the 
transplantation of organs, tissues, and cells into humans.  Human organ 
transplantation can be used to treat diseases of the heart, lungs, liver, 
kidneys, and pancreas, which are some of the most common causes of 
                                                 
19
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully describe the nature of persons in a way that 
is relevant for patentability issues.  For an introduction to the issue, see ERIC T. OLSON, 
Personal Identity, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., Spring 2007), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/identity-
personal/.  Rawls considers moral persons to be those who possess a capacity for a sense 
of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good.  See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 19 (1993). 
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infirmity and death.20  Already, the transplantation of skin tissue is used to 
treat burns, bone to facilitate spinal fusions, and tendons to reconstruct 
knee ligaments.21  Advances in understanding the differentiation of stem 
cells into different cell types have fuelled the belief that stem cell 
transplantation can treat cardiovascular, neurological, pancreatic, 
hematological, dermatological, and musculoskeletal injuries and 
diseases.22  
 
[7]  Autotransplantation and allotransplantation are the types of 
transplantation extensively relied upon today. The former is a process 
through which material is harvested and subsequently transplanted from 
one part of an individual’s body to another. The latter occurs where 
material is harvested from one individual and subsequently transplanted to 
another intra-species.  The limitations associated with autografts (i.e. the 
material used in autotransplantation) include the availability of material as 
well as donor site morbidity.23  The challenges associated with allogeneic 
grafts (i.e. the cells, tissues or organs involved in allotransplantation) 
include: (i) donor-recipient blood type compatibility; (ii) donor-recipient 
physical compatibility (e.g. organ size, capacity and lifespan); (iii) the 
transmission of pathogens (e.g. human immunodeficiency virus, as well as 
hepatitis B and C viruses); (iv) the use of immunosuppressive 
pharmaceuticals to circumvent transplant immunorejection; and (v) 
chronic donor organ shortage.24  
 
                                                 
20See generally Canadian Institute for Health Information, Table 1A, Transplants by 
Organ and Donor Type, Canada and Provinces, Summary Statistics, Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 
2003 (Number) (2), available at 
http://www.cihi.ca/cihiweb/en/downloads/reports_corrstats2003c_t1a_e.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2008). 
21
 See SHARON STEVENSON & STEVEN P. ARNOCZKY, Transplantation of Musculoskeletal 
Tissues, in ORTHOPAEDIC BASIC SCIENCE 567 (Joseph A. Buckwater et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2000). 
22
 See, e.g., STEM CELL AND GENE-BASED THERAPY, supra note 5; Hentze et al., supra 
note 5. 
23
 STEVENSON & ARNOCZKY, supra note 21, at 571.  
24
 See id. at 568-70; Robert I. Lechler et al., Organ Transplantation – How Much of the 
Promise Has Been Realized?, 11 NAT. MED. 605 (2005); Ming H. Zheng et al., 
Challenges in the Evaluation of Safety and Efficacy of Human Tissue and Cell Based 
Products, 76 ANZ J. SURG. 843 (2006). 
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[8]  Some records are available concerning the shortage of organs.  
According to the Canadian Institute for Health Information’s Canadian 
Organ Replacement Register, the number of individuals waiting for an 
(allogeneic) organ transplant in Canada has been relatively stable at 
approximately 4,000 patients between 2001and 2004.25  While roughly 
1,800 transplants had been performed annually during these years, 
approximately 225 patients, or an average of five individuals per week, 
died awaiting a transplant.26  Clinical allotransplantation in Canada has 
been hampered by the lack of available organs for transplantation.27   In 
the United States, the number of individuals on the waiting list for an 
organ transplant for each year between 2001 and 2004 was approximately 
86,700.28 The number of organ transplants that were performed annually 
between 2001 and 2004 averaged approximately 25,400 per year.29  The 
number of individuals who died annually while waiting for a transplant 
during that time period averaged approximately 6,700 per year.30  
Eurotransplant, which gathers transplant statistics for Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Slovenia, a cumulative 
population of approximately 122 million, recorded 15,086 persons on its 
waiting list for 2007.31  For this same population during 2007, the number 
of transplantations was 5,985.32  In the U.K. with a population of 
approximately 60 million, there were 7,234 on the waiting list as of March 
                                                 
25
 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Table 1A, supra note 20. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Canada’s Organ Donation Rate Still Too 
Low to Meet the Need, Reports CIHI, available at 
http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/dispPage.jsp?cw_page=media_14apr2004_e (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2008).  See also Pascal Bucher et al., Xenotransplantation: an Update on Recent 
Progress and Future Perspectives, 18 TRANSPLANT INT’L 894 (2005). 
28
 United Network for Organ Sharing: News, available at http://www.unos.org/./ (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2008).  Note that there is duplication in this result since some patients are 
listed with more than one transplant center. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Eurotransplant, available at http://www.eurotransplant.nl/./ (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).  
This table displays the waiting lists for kidney, heart, liver, lung, and pancreas transplants 
(double transplantations were not counted in this list). 
32
 Id. 
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31, 2007.33  The total number of transplants completed during the financial 
year of 2006-2007 was 3,087.34   
 
[9]  The need for stem cell transplantation is also great.  Human stem cells, 
which have the ability to regenerate through cellular division and 
differentiate into the many different type of cells of the human body, were 
first isolated in 1998 by James Thomson from the inner cell mass of an 
early stage human embryo donated to research from excess embryos 
produced in vitro.35  The sources of human stem cells now include 
embryonic stem cells (isolated from the inner mass of human embryos),36 
adult stem cells, 37 umbilical cord blood cells, 38 and stem cells from 
amniotic fluid.39  The most established stem cell therapies use 
hematopoietic stem cells to treat patients with leukemia, sickle cell 
anemia, bone marrow damage, metabolic disorders, and various 
immunodeficiencies as well as skin grafts to treat severe burns (as skin 
contains stem cells immediately under its top layer).40  Restricted to North 
America alone, it is estimated that 14,985 people had autologous or 
allogeneic stem cell transplantation for leukemia, lymphoma, myeloma, 
myleodysplastic syndrome, and other blood cancers in 2003.41 
                                                 
33
 Transplant Activity in the UK, available at 
http://www.uktransplant.org.uk/ukt/statistics/transplant_activity_report/current_activity_r
eports/ukt/transplant_activity_uk_2006-2007.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). 
34
 Id.  This number is for all transplant types. 
35
 See James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human 
Blastocysts, 6 SCI. 282, 1145-47 (1998).  Plants also have stem cells but only animal stem 
cells are relevant in this context. 
36
 Embryonic stem cells usually come from surplus blastocysts from IVF clinics but can 
also be created through somatic cell nuclear transfer.  See I. Wilmut et al., Somatic Cell 
Nuclear Transfer, 419 NAT. 583 (Oct. 10, 2002). 
37
 See DIRK STRUNK & CHRISTOF STAMM, Adult Human Cells for Myocardial Tissue 
Repair, in STEM CELL AND GENE-BASED THERAPY, supra note 5, at 17. 
38
 See Gal Goldstein et al., Human Umbilical Cord Blood Transplantation: A Viable 
Option for Stem Cell Graft, in STEM CELL AND GENE-BASED THERAPY, supra note 5, at 
333. 
39
 See Paolo De Coppi et al., Isolation of Amniotic Stem Cell Lines with Potential for 
Therapy, 25 NAT. BIOTECH. 100 (2007). 
40
 THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, UNDERSTANDING STEM CELLS, available at 
http://dels.nas.edu/dels/rpt_briefs/stem-cell-high.pdf. 
41
 Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, Blood and Marrow Stem Cell Transplantation, 
available at http://www.leukemia-lymphoma.org/all_page?item_id=5965 (citing Center 
for International Blood & Marrow Transplant Research).  For further information, see 
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[10]  A second need for human materials is for medical research.  The 
production of stem cells, for instance, may contribute toward the 
development of treatments for diseases that are studied. 42  Researchers 
could grow stem cells with specific genetic abnormalities that, if allowed 
to fully develop, could manifest clinically as a given disease such as cystic 
fibrosis, multiple sclerosis, and Alzheimer’s in order to: (i) explore the 
pathogenesis of such conditions; and (ii) elucidate novel biochemical 
targets for target-based drug discovery.43  
 
B. THE POTENTIAL NEED FOR PART-HUMAN MATERIALS 
 
[11]  To address the shortfall of biological materials, other sources, such 
as non-heart beating donors (i.e. organs from patients whose death is 
confirmed by irreversible cardio-pulmonary arrest) as well as the 
application of biotechnological advances, are actively being pursued.44  In 
fact, biosynthetic tissues and organs, including synthetic skin and bone 
substitutes, may eventually become a viable alternative to traditional 
transplantation materials.  Numerous restrictions, however, such as the 
technical limitations associated with engineering complex tissues so as to 
duplicate their innate function in vivo, currently inhibit their production 
and use. 45  As a result, the leading potential solution to this shortage for 
the foreseeable future is xenotransplantation.  
 
[12]  A central limitation of xenotransplantation is the risk of 
xenozoonoses (i.e., the transmission of novel viral and microbial 
pathogens from xenograft to human recipient).46  Further, even if the 
                                                                                                                         
CIBMTR, Progress Report, available at 
http://www.cibmtr.org/ABOUT/Annual_Report/DOCS/annual_report.pdf. 
42
 STEM CELL AND GENE-BASED THERAPY, supra note 5, at vii. 
43
 United Kingdom Parliament, supra note 6.  
44
 See Bucher et al., supra note 27; Ogle et al., supra note 3.  
45
 Mark A. Knight & Gregory R. Evans, Tissue Engineering: Progress and Challenges, 
114 PLAS. & RECONSTR. SURG. 26e, 35e (2004). 
46
 Id. at 32e-33e.  In pigs, these viruses are known as porcine endogenous retroviruses 
(“PERV”).  At present, PERVs cannot be eliminated from the pig’s DNA, but it might be 
possible in the future.  See Interview by Frontline: Organ Farm, Interview with Robin 
Weiss, M.D., Virologist, University College, London, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/organfarm/interviews/weiss.html.  
Examples of existing viruses that have crossed the species barrier include “mad cow” 
disease, Ebola, Hantavirus, rabies, herpes, hepatitis B and C, influenza, and the human 
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problem of xenozoonoses could be solved, xenograft immunorejection 
would remain a critical barrier to xenotransplantation.  The mechanism 
through which an immunological response deleteriously affects a 
xenograft depends upon the type of graft transplanted.47  For example, cell 
and tissue xenografts are susceptible to primary non-function, which is 
characterized by macrophage and cellular-mediated rejection of the 
graft.48  Organ xenografts are subject to various types of vascular 
rejection, among which include mechanisms that are induced by either 
anti-donor antibodies (to galactose-α1,3-galactose oligosaccharides 
present on the graft’s cell surfaces, for example) or T-cells.49  Regardless 
of the specific mechanism, the biochemical cascades involved in the 
immune system’s destruction of a transplanted xenograft are abstruse and 
have yet to be completely understood.50  Confronted with the challenges 
associated with the xenobiotic immunological response, some scientists 
have suggested that the use of animal-human combinations could decrease 
immune system rejection of transplanted materials.51 
 
[13]  The second potential need for part-human biological materials arises 
with the limitations associated with the production of stem cells for 
research and transplantation. Eventually the reprogramming of an 
                                                                                                                         
immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), which probably originated in monkeys.  See, e.g., 
FDA, Guidance for Industry: Public Health Issues Posed by the Use of Nonhuman 
Primate Xenografts in Humans (“FDA Primate Guidelines”), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/CBER/gdlns/xenoprim.pdf. 
47
 Jeffrey L. Platt, Knocking Out Xenograft Rejection, 20 NAT. BIOTECH. 231, 231 (2002). 
48
 Id. at 231, fig. 1. 
49
 Id.  The binding of the recipient’s endogenous antibodies to galactose-α1,3-galactose 
oligosaccharides present on the xenotransplant’s cell surfaces results in the graft’s 
parenchyma and vasculature being immediately destroyed upon reperfusion due to 
interstitial hemorrhage and thrombosis.  This process, which is the first immunological 
insult that must be surmounted, is known as hyperacute rejection.  See Henk-Jan 
Schuurman et al., Pathology of Xenograft Rejection: A Commentary, 10 
XENOTRANSPLANTATION 293, 294 (2003). 
50
 See L. Bühler et al., Xenotransplantation – State of the Art – Update 1999, 4 
FRONTIERS IN BIOSCI. 416, 425 (1999).  While powerful immunosuppressive drugs have 
decreased the rate of acute rejection significantly, long-term functional graft survival is 
poor due to chronic rejection.  See Spiros Delis et al., Bone Marrow-Induced Tolerance 
in the Era of Pancreas and Islets Transplantation, 32 PANCREAS 1, 1 (2006). 
51
 See, e.g., Cristina Costa et al., Transgenic Pigs Designed to Express Human CD59 and 
H-Transferase to Avoid Humoral Xenograft Rejection, 9 XENOTRANSPLANTATION 45 
(2002); Robin A. Weiss, Transgenic Pigs and Virus Adaptation, 391 NATURE 327 (1998). 
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individual’s own cells may allow for the autotransplantation of stem cells, 
but the technology is, so far, still experimental.52  In the meantime, a large 
number of human eggs is required for research, the availability of which is 
limited.53  Surplus eggs that are from in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) clinics 
are limited and in some jurisdictions not available at all.54  Furthermore, 
“the use of human eggs for research has also raised concerns about 
whether it is appropriate to encourage women to undergo an invasive and 
potentially harmful procedure [to collect eggs], without providing any 
direct medical benefit to the donor.”55  Even if sufficient surplus human 
stem cells were available from IVF clinics for research and 
transplantation, there would be a risk of immune incompatibility with the 
recipient of the stem cells.56  In addition, when human eggs are available, 
it is very difficult to create a human embryonic stem cell line that clones 
the genetic makeup of the recipient.57  Finally, there are ethical issues 
concerning the creation of human embryonic stem cells where it involves 
the destruction of a human blastocyst.58  Thus, some researchers are 
planning to use techniques that combine human DNA with a cow’s egg to 
produce cow-human hybrid embryos for research purposes.59  Other 
researchers are investigating alternative sources of stem cells for 
transplantation, such as fetal porcine cells.60  
                                                 
52
 Takahashi K. et al., Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Adult Human Fibroblasts 
by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861, 869 (2007). 
53
 Dr. Lyle Armstrong of Newcastle University notes that “we would need in excess of 30 
oocytes [eggs] to have a reasonable chance of producing an ESC [embryonic stem cell] 
line for each patient.”  See United Kingdom Parliament, supra note 6, at ¶ 51.  Dr. 
Stephen Minger at King's College London stated that “until the efficiency of successful 
SCNT [somatic cell nuclear transfer] in humans can be increased significantly (to perhaps 
10-20%) ten to twenty percent) alternative sources of oocytes specifically for SCNT are 
needed.”  Id. 
54
 For example, German Embryo Protection Law prohibits the fertilization of more eggs 
than are necessary for implantation within one cycle.  See Christian Starck, Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research According to German and European Law - Part 2/2, 7 GERMAN L.J. 
(2006), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=740. 
55
 See United Kingdom Parliament, supra note 6, at ¶ 50. 
56
 THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 40, at 14.  
57
 “Hwang failed to generate a stem cell line after nuclear transfer – or cloning – of 2,000 
fresh human eggs.”  See King’s College London, Stem Cell Research License Application 
(2006), available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/phpnews/wmview.php?ArtID=1476. 
58
  United Kingdom Parliament, supra note 6, at ¶ 34-44. 
59
 Id. 
60
 STEM CELL AND GENE-BASED THERAPY, supra note 5, at 124. 
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II. PART-HUMAN MATERIALS FOR TRANSPLANTATION 
 
[14]  Three kinds of part-human materials are of primary interest for 
transplantation: embryonic chimeras, transgenic materials, and 
cytoplasmic hybrid stem cells or “cybrids.”61    
 
A. CHIMERAS 
 
[15]  A broad concept of the chimeric organism, broader than the one that 
is contained in the Canadian legislation, is “. . . a mixture of cells from 
two or more genetically distinct organisms of the same or different 
species.”62  For instance, human-animal embryonic chimeras can be 
                                                 
61
 For a useful categorization of part-humans see the United Kingdom Parliament, supra 
note 6, at ¶ 27-31. 
62
 Francoise Baylis & Jason S. Robert, Part-Human Chimeras: Worrying the Facts, 
Probing the Ethics. , 7(5) AM. J. BIOETHICS 41, 41 (2007).  Both Canadian law and 
proposed U.S. legislation concern human chimeras rather than chimeras generally.  
Human Chimera Prohibition Act of 2005, S. 659, 109th Cong. (2005); Human Chimera 
Prohibition Act of 2005, S. 1373, 109th Cong. (2005)); Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act, 2004 S.C., c.2 (Can.).  Under Canadian legislation, for instance, “chimera” has been 
narrowly defined as “an embryo into which a cell of any non-human life form has been 
introduced” or “an embryo that consists of cells of more than one embryo, foetus or 
human being.”  In addition, "embryo" means a human organism during the first 56 days 
of its development following fertilization or creation, excluding any time during which its 
development has been suspended, and includes any cell derived from such an organism 
that is used for the purpose of creating a human being. Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act, 2004 S.C., c. 2, s. 3 (Can.).  Therefore, it does not prohibit the incorporation of 
human genetic material into non-humans, although it prohibits the creation of other forms 
of part-humans.  Section 301 of the U.S. Human Chimera Prohibition Act of 2005, which 
did not pass, defined “human chimera” to mean :  
(A) a human embryo into which a non-human cell, or any component 
part of a non-human cell, has been introduced; (B) a human embryo 
that consists of cells derived from more than 1 human embryo, fetus, or 
born individual;  (C) a human egg that has been fertilized by a non-
human sperm;  (D) a non-human egg that has been fertilized by a 
human sperm; (E) a human egg into which a non-human nucleus has 
been introduced; (F) a non-human egg into which a human nucleus has 
been introduced; (G) a human egg or a non-human egg that otherwise 
contains haploid sets of chromosomes from both a human and a non-
human life form; (H) a non-human life form engineered such that 
human gametes develop within the body of a non-human life form; or 
(I) a non-human life form engineered such that it contains a human 
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produced through the fusing of human cells (e.g. stem cells) with a non-
human embryo yielding an organism whose individual cells are derived 
entirely from either the animal or the human.63  Examples of chimeras 
include: (i) the incorporation of human stem cells into post-blastocyst 
stages of non-human embryos of mice, sheep, monkeys, pigs, and goats;64 
and (ii) the incorporation of human stem cells into a mouse blastocyst.65 
 
[16]  The rationale for using a chimera as a source of biological material 
for transplantation begins by considering the shortcomings of other 
sources of materials.  Setting aside the reproductive cloning of an entire 
human for spare parts as immoral and impractical (because of the long 
period of organogenesis), another method of creating materials for 
transplantation would be to generate an organ through tissue engineering.  
This might be attempted by using somatic cell nuclear transfer to generate 
embryonic stem cells that are histocompatible with (i.e. will not be 
rejected by) the individual, and then those embryonic stem cells could be 
used to generate a functional organ, such as a lung.66  However, at this 
time, little is known about whether, and to what extent, stem cells can be 
coaxed into developing into intact anatomically complex organs with 
functioning vasculature.67   
 
[17]  Consequently, it has been suggested that organogenesis might best 
occur in an animal host as a xenograft, allowing human cells to fuse with 
those of the host animal.68  At the Mayo clinic, Platt carried out an 
experiment in which human hematopoietic stem cells (from which all red 
and white blood cells develop) were injected into fetal pigs at forty days 
                                                                                                                         
brain or a brain derived wholly or predominantly from human neural 
tissues.   
Human Chimera Prohibition Act of 2005, S. 1373, 109th Cong. § 301 (2005). 
63
 Baylis & Robert, Part-Human Chimeras, supra note 62, at 44. 
64
 BioCentre, supra note 7. 
65
 Id.  In 2003, it was reported that scientists from Maria Biotech in South Korea injected 
human embryonic stem cells labeled with a fluorescent protein into 11 eleven mouse 
blastocysts which later developed in foster mice.  The five offspring contained 
fluorescent cells in the heart, kidney, liver, and bones.  Nell Boyce, Mixing Species – and 
Crossing a Line?, 135(14) U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 27, 2003, at 58. 
66
 BioCentre, supra note 7; Ogle, supra note 3, at 75.   
67
 Ogle, supra note 3, at 75; see also Knight & Evans, supra note 45.  
68
 Ogle, supra note 3, at 76.  
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gestation.69  When the pigs were born, human cells were found in their 
internal organs and throughout the blood system. 70  However, the pigs 
were not pure chimeras as over 60% of the non-pig cells were pig-human 
hybrid cell fusions in which two cells were integrated into a new viable 
cell.71  This methodology of growing organs in host animals has been 
furthered by Esmail Zanjani whose group transplanted embryonically 
derived human hematopoietic stem cells into a sheep’s foetus.72  These 
grown sheep-human chimeras were subsequently reported to have had 
organs, including a liver, heart, and pancreas that are 15% human.73  
Crucially, where development of an organ takes place in a foreign 
environment, it acquires the necessary blood vessels from the host.74  
Unfortunately, as a result, an organ developed in an animal host would 
contain xenogeneic blood vessels, which in turn would be targeted by the 
host immune system.75  It is hoped, however, that after transplantation of 
the part-human organs developed using this method, the human part of the 
organs would be accepted even if the non-human part is rejected.76 
 
B. TRANSGENICS 
 
[18]  While chimeric organisms possess two genetically distinct 
populations of cells, transgenic organisms consist of only one genetically 
distinct population of cells that have been altered by the introduction of 
                                                 
69
 Gaia Vince, Pig-Human Chimeras Contain Cell Surprise, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 13, 
2004, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn4558-pighuman-chimeras-
contain-cell-surprise.html.  See also, Platt, supra note 47. 
70
 Vince, supra note 69. 
71
 Id.  These cell fusions were found to be synkaryons, hybrids in which not only the cell 
membrane and cytoplasm has fused but also the nuclear membrane and nucleaplasm have 
as well.  For further information on synkaryons, see ARIE H. BARTAL & YASHAR 
HIRSHAUT, METHODS OF HYBRIDOMA FORMATION 2 (Humana Press 1987).   
72
 Christopher Thomas Scott, Chimeras in the Crosshairs, 24 NAT. BIOTECH. 487, 488 
(2006).  See also Claudia Joseph, Now Scientists Create a Sheep That’s 15% Human, 
DAILY MAIL, available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=444436&in
_page_id=1770&in_a_source=&ct=5 (last visited July 3, 2007). 
73
 Scott, supra note 72, at 488. 
74
 Ogle, supra note 3, at 76. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Scott, supra note 72, at 488. 
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DNA sequences from sources external to the organism.77  Numerous 
attempts have been made to manipulate a given organism’s genome by 
inserting a xenogenic gene in order to achieve the expression of a desired 
phenotype.78  One of the goals of some recent genetic engineering is the 
“humanization” of xenograft organs to improve their 
immunocompatibility with humans.79  To this end, much focus has been 
placed on the use of pigs.  Despite the immunological disparity between 
humans and pigs, pigs are preferred over other species due to their 
superiority in terms of breeding, availability, and cost; moreover they are 
also morally less problematic compared to animals higher on the 
phylogenetic scale.80  In addition, the fact that pigs do share a certain 
degree of physiological, anatomical and biochemical similarities with 
humans,81 and that the porcine genome can be readily manipulated 
through genetic engineering, also weigh in favor of their use.82  
 
[19]  One of the first transgenic pigs specifically engineered for 
xenotransplantation was the human complement regulatory protein 
(hDAF) transgenic pig.83  While hDAF does not prevent anti-galactose-
α1,3-galactose antibody binding, the incorporation of this human gene into 
the porcine genome resulted in the expression of a protein capable of 
inhibiting the complement cascade involved in hyperacute rejection 
(“HAR”) of xenografts.84  While the results from a study in which hDAF 
chimeric organs were transplanted into primates demonstrated that the 
                                                 
77
 See generally BioCentre, The New Inter-Species Future? An Ethical Discussion of 
Embryonic, Fetal and Post-Natal Human-Nonhuman Combinations, June 2007, available 
at http://www.bioethics.ac.uk/index.php?do=topic&sid=13 (last visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
78
 Id. at 48-49.  Examples include the production of human insulin and the expression of 
human protein in the milk of goats and sheep and the “white” of chicken eggs.  Id.  See 
generally Pascal Bucher et al., Xenotransplantation: An Update on Recent Progress and 
Future Perspectives, 18 TRANSPLANT INT’L 894 (2005).  
79
 Interview by Frontline with Robin Weiss, supra note 46.   
80
 Bucher et al., supra note 27.  
81
 Id. 
82
 A. Ravelingien & J. Braeckman, To the Core of Porcine Matter: Evaluating Arguments 
Against Producing Transgenic Pigs, 11 XENOTRANSPLANTATION 371 (2004). 
83
 Henk-Jan Schuurman et al., Incidence of Hyperacute Rejection in Pig-to-Primate 
Transplantation Using Organs From hDAF-Transgenic Donors, 15 TRANSPLANTATION 
1146 (2002). 
84
 Id.; see also Interview by Frontline with Robert Weiss, M.D., supra note 46. 
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genetic modification successfully circumvented HAR,85 this approach 
does not seem to adequately circumvent the problem of chronic graft 
rejection.86  Research is, therefore, presently taking place to try to 
eliminate or reduce these epitopes while genetically engineering the 
expression of human complement regulatory proteins, such as CD59, in 
animals.87 
 
C. CYBRIDS 
 
[20]  The shortage of human embryonic stem cells, and the concerns 
associated with the destruction of human embryos to produce embryonic 
stem cells, has resulted in the call for the creation and use of embryos of, 
and stem cells derived from, animal-human combinations.88  The idea is to 
use non-human eggs stripped of their chromosomes as a host for the 
production of part-human stem cells, analogous to the use of pigs or sheep 
as a host for the production of part-human organs.89  In fact, in 1998, 
Advanced Cell Technology claimed that it had created an embryo, a so-
called “cytoplasmic hybrid embryo,”90 by fusing the nucleus of an adult 
human cell with an enucleated cow egg using nuclear transfer of skin 
                                                 
85
 Schuurman et al., supra note 83.   
86Another study demonstrated that the median survival time of hDAF-expressing porcine 
kidneys in monkeys, albeit an improvement over controls, was merely thirteen days.  See 
Afzal Zaidi et al., Life-Supporting Pig-to-Primate Renal Xenotransplantation Using 
Genetically Modified Donors, 65 TRANSPLANTATION 1584 (1998). 
87
 See U.S. Patent No. 7,166,278 (filed Jan. 23, 2007), available at 
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrc
hnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=7,166,278.PN.&OS=PN/7,166,278&RS=PN/7,166,278.  
88
  United Kingdom Parliament, supra note 6. 
89
 The U.K. Biosciences Federation is an example of an industry association that has 
called for the regulated use of chimeric stem cells for research purposes.  However, it 
appears that such research purposes may include clinical uses in subjects.  See 
Biosciences Federation, Government Proposals for the Regulation of Hybrid and 
Chimera Embryos, available at http://www.bsf.ac.uk/responses/HybridEmbryos.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
90
 See the United Kingdom Parliament, supra note 6.  Note that, according to BioCentre, 
“[t]he term hybrid may be misleading if one is normally used to restricting the term to the 
progeny resulting from sexual reproduction, whilst the term chimera may be misleading 
if one normally only associates this with an organism containing a distinct population of 
cells which differ in their genetic origin.”  BioCentre, supra note 7, at 55.  
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cells.91  This egg, and the cells derived from the early age embryo which 
develops therefrom, could be used to provide an interim solution to the 
shortage of human stem cells for research and, perhaps, for transplantation 
purposes.  
 
[21]  Research teams from King’s College, London and Newcastle 
University recently were granted separate licenses from the U.K. Human 
Fertilization and Embryo Authority (“HFEA”) to produce embryonic stem 
cells by inserting the nucleus of a human cell, such as a skin cell, into the 
trophoblast or “shell” of a cow egg.92  The research will involve the 
creation of embryos that would be approximately 1% animal and 99% 
human.93  To be clear, these research teams have no plans to use any of the 
embryos for transplantation and must destroy them within fourteen days.94  
Rather, they are intended to be used as a means of experimenting on cow 
eggs to improve the ability to create human embryonic stem cells using 
human eggs,95 and to develop disease-specific human embryonic stem cell 
                                                 
91
 It should be noted that the conclusion drawn by company officials was merely 
inferential; no assays were carried out to determine whether the cells created were in fact 
human stem cells.  See Eliot Marshall, Claim of Human-Cow Embryo Greeted With 
Skepticism, 282 SCI. 1390 (1998).  
92
  See Human Fertilisation & Embrylogy Authority, Research News, available at 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/en/377.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
93
 “Any being created in this way would have DNA 99% identical with that of the adult 
from whom the human nucleus was taken; the remaining 1% of DNA (i.e. mitochondrial 
DNA) would come from the unnucleated animal oocyte.”).  See Baylis & Roberts, 
Crossing Species Boundaries, supra note 17, at 8.  Interestingly, one of the applicants, 
Stephen Minger from King’s College, glossed over the fact that a small percentage of the 
embryo will be non-human.  He said that, “[o]nce the nucleus of the animal egg is 
removed it essentially no longer has a species identity and when replaced with a human 
nucleus, the resulting embryo and cell line will have human genetic identity.”  Press 
Release, King’s College London, Stem Cell Research License Application (Nov. 7, 
2006), available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/phpnews/wmview.php?ArtID=1476.  As the 
HFEA notes, “. . . this is not strictly correct, as although the vast majority of genetic 
identity would be human, heritable extra-nuclear genetic material such as that present in 
the cellular structures mitochondria would be bovine in origin.”  PHG Foundation, 
Human-Cow Chimeric Embryos for Stem Cell Research, Nov. 2006, available at 
http://www.phgu.org.uk/ecard?link_ID=2798 (last visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
94
 Science Daily, Hybrid Human-Animal Embryo Research Approved in the UK, Jan. 18, 
2008, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/01/080118102223.htm.  
95
 Press Release, Newcastle University, Researchers Seek Permission for Stem Cell Work 
Using Animal Eggs, (Nov. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.ncl.ac.uk/press.office/press.release/content.phtml?ref=1162836050 (last 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 4 
 
 19
lines from individuals suffering from genetic forms of neurodegenerative 
disorders in order to assist in developing new treatments for such 
diseases.96 
 
III. PROHIBITED CATEGORIES: HUMAN BEINGS, HIGHER LIFE FORMS OR 
PERSONS? 
 
A.  PROHIBITING THE PATENTING OF HUMANS AND HIGHER LIFE FORMS 
 
[22]  Even if the creation and use of part-human materials could solve the 
problem of immune rejection, there would very likely be objections to the 
creation, use and patenting of such materials on the basis that such actions 
compromise the value of human beings. According to this criticism, while 
human biological materials are of value for their use in research and 
transplantation, human beings are of value because of the sanctity97 of 
human life and the dignity98 of human beings.  On such a view, human 
beings are not patentable because it is incompatible with their special 
                                                                                                                         
visited Mar. 20, 2008).  Minger notes, “[b]ut I will stress that the cell lines derived by 
SCNT will only be used for biological and pharmacological research, not for therapeutic 
purposes.”  Press Release, King’s College London, Stem Cell Research Licence 
Application, supra note 93.  
96
 Press Release, King’s College London, Stem Cell Research Licence Application, supra 
note 93.  The use of part-human embryos in such research has been supported by the 
U.K.  United Kingdom Parliament, supra note 6.   Notwithstanding, there is significant 
opposition to the mixing of human adult somatic cells with the live eggs of any non-
human animal species.  See BioCentre, supra note 7, at 59. 
97
 For example, the Supreme Court of Canada said that “human life is seen to have a deep 
intrinsic [i.e. non-instrumental] value of its own” and legally is protected under s. 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter]; Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 1993 SCC 75 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN 
ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993)).  
98
 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785), 
available at http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/kgw.html (treating dignity as a worth of 
humans that is incomparably more valuable than that of mere goods); Timothy Caulfield 
& Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity: A Guide to Policy Making in the Biotechnology 
Era?, 7 NAT. REV. GENETICS 72 (2006) (surveying the use of dignity in bioethics and 
patenting issues and criticizing its use as a theoretical concept).  In this article, however, 
the authors appear to use “dignity” in the sense of “intrinsic worth,” thereby appearing to 
run the two kinds of value together.  Id.  For a book-length exposition of the value of the 
sanctity of life, see DWORKIN, supra note 97. 
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standing.  More generally, the prohibition against patenting humans might 
be considered to be a special case of a more general prohibition against the 
patenting of any higher life forms.99    
 
[23]  The problem with a rule against patenting humans is the assumption 
of a fixed, well-defined human species identity.  As Jason Scott and 
Francoise Baylis have pointed out, “[m]orally, . . . we rely on the notion of 
fixed species identities and boundaries in the way we live our lives and 
treat other creatures, whether in decisions about what we eat or what we 
patent.”100  However, this reliance is misplaced, given that the concept of 
human is too vague to determine when any given part-human material 
counts as human.  This point is not made to ground an overbroad, 
skeptical thesis that patent law is inherently indeterminate.  Rather, the 
point is the narrower one that the concept of human cannot be 
determinately applied to part-human biological materials which are needed 
for medical purposes.  Additional patentability criteria are needed, 
therefore, in order to determine whether part-human materials – whether 
they are animal-human combinations or early stages of human 
development – are patentable. 
 
[24]  Further, the vagueness is not merely linguistic, but reflects the fact 
that the common descent of animals has not resulted in any qualitative 
features – morphological, genetic, or behavioural – that can be considered 
essential for species membership.101  Because of mutation, recombination, 
and random drift of genetic material, any given trait considered to be 
essential to a species could disappear in a future member of the species, 
making it a non-essential property.102  Modern genomics shows, for 
example, that we are very close to chimpanzees: our genomes differ by a 
                                                 
99
 As will be discussed, infra, this is the view of the Canadian Supreme Court in Harvard 
College, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (Can.).  In that judgment, however, the Canadian Supreme 
Court purported to base its view solely on an interpretation of relevant legislation rather 
than concern itself with the moral implications of patenting humans or higher life forms. 
100
 Robert & Baylis, supra note 17, at 6.  
101
 Marc Ereshefsky, Species, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward 
N. Zalta ed.) (Summer 2007), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/species. 
102
 Id. 
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mere 1.23%. 103  Even mice and humans are close genetically.  While 
humans and mice diverged some 32 million years ago,104 approximately 
99% of the genes in humans have counterparts in the mouse, and 80% 
have identical, one-to-one counterparts.105  
 
[25]  Even if one started with a paradigm case of a human, say, any adult 
member of the species Homo sapiens, it is tempting to say that if there 
were very small differences between that paradigmatically human creature 
and another creature, the other creature would still be a human.  For 
example, if a small amount of foreign DNA is added to a human, it is still 
a human (or similarly, if a small amount of human DNA is added to a non-
human animal it is still non-human).  Through iteration of this principle, 
however, one is led to the conclusion that very little, if any, human DNA 
is required for something to be human.106  Further, any distinction to be 
drawn between human and non-human based upon relative amounts of 
human and non-non-human DNA would appear to be arbitrary. 
 
[26]  A second kind of vagueness concerns development: when does an 
individual animal or human life begin?  Obviously there is a sense in 
which a sperm and egg from humans, for instance, are human forms of life 
rather than, say, a mouse form of life, but is that the relevant concept of a 
human life for the purposes of patenting?  On the definition assumed in 
this paper, a human being at any stage of development is part-human – 
                                                 
103
 Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, Initial Sequence of the 
Chimpanzee Genome and Comparison with the Human Genome 437 NATURE 69, 69 
(2005) (regarding single-nucleotide substitutions); Wen-Hsiung Li & Matthew A. 
Saunders, News and Views: The Chimpanzee and Us, 437 NATURE 50 (2005).  
104
 See Chen Su & Masatoshi Nei, Evolutionary Dynamics of the T-Cell Receptor VB 
Gene Family as Inferred from the Human and Mouse Genomic Sequences, 18 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY EVOLUTION 503 (2001), cited in Stuart A. Newman, Averting the 
Clone Age: Prospects and Perils of Human Development Manipulation, 19 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y, 431, 456 (2003).  
105
 See Chris Gunter & Ritu Dhand, Human Biology by Proxy, 420 NATURE 509 (2002).);   
Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium, Initial Sequencing and Comparative Analysis of 
the Mouse Genome, 420 NATURE 520 (2002). 
106
 This classic sorites argument assumed that if you take away a grain of sand from a 
heap of sand, it would still be a heap.  Hence, by iteration, one grain of sand is a heap of 
sand, which is false.  “Sorites” comes from the Greek term “soros,” which means heap.  
Dominic Hyde, Sorites Paradox, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed.) (Fall 2005), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/sorites-paradox.  
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because it contains human DNA – but at what stage is a developing 
embryo considered to be an individual human being for the purposes of 
the principle against patenting human beings?  If one considers only the 
material basis of a human, it is tempting to say that every stage of 
development of a human being from the fertilized egg onward is a human 
being.  That is, if one starts with a paradigmatic fully developed human 
and accepts the principle that at the immediately prior stage of 
development of a human being the organism was a human being, then the 
conclusion must be that at every stage at which an organism is developing 
into a human being, it is a human being.  
 
[27]  It follows from this conclusion that even the zygote of a human being 
is itself a human being; just as the zygote of a sheep is itself a sheep.  The 
idea that the zygote of a human is a human follows from the view that the 
development of an organism from a zygote is considered to be merely the 
growth of a “preformed” body or the deterministic result of material 
internal to the zygote, rather than the gradual epigenesis of a human 
embryo into a human being through the interaction of various internal and 
external developmental factors.107  The historical figures associated with 
the preformationist doctrine include the biologists von Hartsoeker who, in 
1694, used the image of a tiny man in the sperm, and Weissman who, in 
1893, put forward a kind of genetic determinism in which cell division 
produces a mosaic of cells with different chromosomal materials so that 
“the fate of the cells is determined by forces situated within them, and not 
by external influences.”108  Similarly, the modern genetic version of 
preformation construes development as “a matter of the epigenetic 
activation of preformed genetic information.” 109  It appears, on this 
genetic preformationist view, that development is nothing more than the 
activation of what is already present in the embryo and that the 
characteristics of adult humans are an expression of the genetic structure 
resulting from this activation.  The implication of genetic preformationism 
                                                 
107
 See JANE MAIENSCHEIN, WHOSE VIEW OF LIFE?: EMBRYOS, CLONING, AND STEM 
CELLS  (2003). 
108
 AUGUST WEISMANWEISSMAN, THE GERM PLASM 32, 134 (W. Newton Parker & 
Harriet Rönnfeldt trans.) (1893), quoted in Jane Maienschein, Epigenesis and 
Preformationism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed.) 
(Fall 2006), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/epigenesis.  
109
 JASON SCOTT ROBERT, EMBRYOLOGY, EPIGENEIS AND EVOLUTION: TAKING 
DEVELOPMENT SERIOUSLY 56 (2004).  
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is that human fetuses, human embryos, human fertilized eggs, and human 
totipotent stem cells110 are unpatentable because they are human beings 
merely in virtue of the presence of human DNA.  It also follows that, if 
mature animal-human combinations had sufficient human DNA to be 
considered human, then every stage of development of that part-human 
would be unpatentable, even if it is never allowed to develop to maturity. 
 
[28]  The problem with the application of a preformationist analysis of 
development to patent law is that it is neither coherent with modern 
biological theory nor patent law.  If human beings are unpatentable, then 
every human cell containing genetic material would be unpatentable on the 
preformationist view and this would significantly depart from existing 
patent law and policy.111 Furthermore, the modern view of development is 
interactionist, which according to Mayr, is a “synthesis of epigenesis and 
preformation.”112  For Mayr, “[t]he process of development, the unfolding 
phenotype, is epigenetic.  However, development is also preformationist 
because the zygote contains an inherited genetic program that largely 
determines the phenotype.”113  On this interactionist consensus, an 
individual life is not identified with its genetic blueprint and, therefore, the 
concept of an individual animal or human being need not encompass every 
stage of its development.114  
 
[29]  A third kind of vagueness concerns the biological concepts of higher 
and lower life form, which are distinguished by their degrees of cellular 
complexity.  On this view, unicellular organisms are considered to be 
lower life forms while multicellular life forms are higher life forms .Using 
this distinction, one could attempt to avoid the problem of the vagueness 
of the concept of human by adopting the rule that no higher life forms are 
                                                 
110
 A totipotent stem cell can give rise to all the cell types that make up the body plus all 
of the cell types that make up the extraembryonic tissues such as the placenta.  See U.S. 
National Institute of Health, http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2008).   
111
 It departs from patent law because of the fact that isolated human genetic material is 
generally considered to be patentable. CAMPBELL et. al., supra note 10. 
112
 ROBERT, supra note 109, at 39. 
113
 ERNST MAYR, THIS IS BIOLOGY 158 (1887), quoted in ROBERT, supra note 109, at 38-
39. 
114
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patentable, including humans.115 Accordingly, no higher life form, 
whether it is a multicellular human or a multicellular animal-human 
combination, is patentable.  There is no need, on this view, to determine 
the amount of human DNA that is needed to be unpatentable.  So long as 
the subject matter is a higher life form, it is unpatentable.  
 
[30]  The main problem with cellular complexity as a criterion for 
patentability is the absence of a rationale for it.  Even if there were a 
rationale, however, it would be difficult to provide a justification for the 
fact that that the zygote of a higher life form would be patentable but no 
further development of the zygote would be patentable.  Further, why does 
the higher/lower distinction coincide with multicellular/unicellular? One 
could attempt to avoid the problem of justifying the distinction by 
deeming a higher life form to include all of its stages of development from 
fertilized eggs onward.116  Hence, a fertilized animal egg would be 
considered to be a higher life form despite being a single cell, the least 
degree of cellular complexity.   
 
[31]  The claim that a zygote of a higher life form is itself a higher life 
form follows from the preformationist view described above since the 
zygote contains the genetic information that guides development. 
However, it is important to understand that the preformationist view is 
unable to limit the class of unpatentable cells to zygotes. In other words, 
since the nuclei of virtually all differentiated adult cells of an organism are 
genetically identical to each other and to the nucleus of the zygote from 
which they descended, in a broad sense, virtually all cells are totipotent.117  
Even a skin cell of a higher life form would be a higher life form in a 
broad sense because, given the appropriate technology, such as somatic 
cell nuclear transfer, it could – in the right environment and with the right 
technology – develop into an adult higher life form.118  In the future, it 
                                                 
115
 Harvard College, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 2002 SCC 76 (Can.). 
116
 As does the Canadian Intellectual Property Office in its OFFICE PRACTICE REGARDING 
FERTILIZED EGGS, STEM CELLS, ORGANS AND TISSUES, supra note 14. 
117
 This is the principle of nuclear equivalence.  Clones and Clones, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/n/nussbaum-clones.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2008).   
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may even be possible to induce any human adult cell to become totipotent 
or pluripotent without the need of an unfertilized oocyte.119  Hence, on 
such reasoning, every cell of a higher life form would be considered to be 
a higher life form and, thus unpatentable, despite being relatively simple 
in terms of cellular complexity.  
 
[32]  One might attempt to avoid the dubious conclusion that every cell of 
a higher life is unpatentable while saving the notion that only totipotent 
cells are unpatentable higher life forms by making a distinction between 
naturally totipotent cells (which would be unpatentable higher life forms) 
and artificial totipotent cells developed through the application of a given 
technology (which would be patentable lower life forms).120  If the 
artificial/natural distinction is apt, however, it would render the cellular 
complexity distinction irrelevant to determining whether biological 
material is patentable. Patentability would depend merely upon whether 
technology has been used utilized to isolate the material. One would have 
to conclude, for example, that isolated totipotent stem cells that could be 
used for therapeutic purposes would fall within the artificially totipotent 
class because they have been isolated through the application of 
technology, rendering them patentable.   
 
B.  PROHIBITING THE PATENTING OF PERSONS 
 
[33]  Some writers have suggested that it is wrong to determine 
patentability based upon fine distinctions between types of subject 
matter.121  However, given that in practice European, American, and 
Canadian patent-granting authorities do apply rules based upon the type of 
subject matter, a less radical solution is to replace the rule against 
patenting humans – and higher life forms in Canada - with a rule against 
patenting persons.  This replacement is not meant to suggest that 
personhood is necessarily the only basis upon which to prohibit patents, 
                                                                                                                         
every cell is pluripotent is not patentable, while all of the cells of which it is composed 
are patentable. 
119
 Takahashi K. et al., supra note 52.     
120
 William J. Fitzpatrick, Totipotency and the Moral Status of Embryos: New Problems 
for an Old Argument, 35 J. SOC. PHIL. 108 (2004) (discussing a similar counterargument 
in the context of an argument against a human embryo having moral status).   
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but merely that it replace the prohibition against patenting humans and, in 
Canada, higher life forms.  Nor does it assume that the concept of a person 
is completely precise.  However, by relying upon non-biological criteria to 
determine patentability, the new rule dispenses with the problem that 
biological criteria are too vague to distinguish between patentable and 
unpatentable biological material in a principled way.   
 
[34]  This rule is not entirely new, but is rarely described clearly in 
contrast to the existing rule against patenting humans.  A number of years 
ago, for instance, Rachel Fishman proposed amending U.S. patent 
legislation to define “human” very broadly as, roughly, something born of 
a human or any animal possessing higher faculties.122  Similarly, Thomas 
Magnani implicitly suggested the rule against patenting persons when he 
remarked that “[i]f a creature possessed the ability to reason in this fashion 
(commonly known as self-awareness), the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
office [USPTO] likely would find it to be human under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.”123  Finally, patent lawyer Sander Rabin recently proposed 
that there be a presumption against patents on genes or cells known to 
endow sentience or to affect human intellect, emotion, or behaviour, and a 
refusal to grant patents on genes functions until they are known not to 
endow an entity with human characteristics. 124   
 
[35]  The acceptability of a rule prohibiting the patenting of human 
biological materials when they are persons will depend largely upon its 
ethical implications.125  On the proposed view, while most persons are 
biologically human, they need not be, as persons are beings with 
additional properties or powers, such as rationality and autonomy.126  
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 Rachel E. Fishman, Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures Deserve 
Constitutional Protection?, 15 AM. J. L. & MED. 461, 480-81 (1989). 
123
 Thomas Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. 
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24 NATURE BIOTECH. 517, 519 (2006).   
126
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Personhood is independent of membership in the species Homo sapiens.127 
Thus, the main problem associated with using biological concepts as 
criteria for patentability is that their use would depart from the ethical 
view that humans per se are the fundamental bearers of rights, the centre 
of the ethical universe.128 
 
[36]  It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the criteria for moral 
standing. It is worthwhile noting, however, that, according to Singer, 
within the near future the value of humanity as an end in and of itself will 
be replaced with the value of persons: 
 
During the next 35 years, the traditional view of the 
sanctity of human life will collapse under pressure from 
scientific, technological, and demographic developments . . 
.  [w]hen the traditional ethic of the sanctity of human life 
is proven indefensible at both the beginning and end of life, 
a new ethic will replace it.  It will recognize that the 
concept of a person is distinct from that of a member of the 
species Homo sapiens, and that it is personhood, not 
species membership, that is most significant . . . . 129 
 
[37]  Biotechnology is important from a philosophical perspective because 
the distinction between humanity and personhood would be practically 
                                                                                                                         
used merely as means) - which makes such a being an object 
of respect, and something that sets limits to what anyone can 
choose to do.   
Kant, supra note 98, at 28.  The central importance of persons has been followed by non-
consequentialists, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 19 (Columbia Univ. Press 
1993), as well as by consequentialists, see JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, 
MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE (Oxford Univ. Press 1986).  Caulfield and 
Brownsword are critical of the use of the concept of dignity, claiming that, since the 
concept of human dignity is a contested concept, it “is in danger of devolving into a 
hollow rhetorical slogan.”  See Caulfield & Brownsword, supra note 98, at 76. 
127
 Peter Singer, Sanctity of Life, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 41.  If that criticism 
had any merit it would apply equally to the concept of equality, justice, fairness, and 
many other important concepts.  
128
 See generally Peter Singer, In Place of the Old Ethic, in WRITINGS ON AN ETHICAL 
LIFE (2000) (discussing the ethical implications of the value of persons).  
129
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manifested if a non-human person were created through genetic 
engineering.  So, those who want to retain a close connection between 
personhood and humanity are opposed to creating animal-human 
combinations.  For example, in response to the application by researchers 
at King’s College, London and Newcastle University to the U.K. Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority to create a mixed ninety-nine 
percent human and one-percent cow egg in order to conduct further 
research into the treatment of various illnesses, Calum MacKellar, the 
Director of Research of the Scottish Council of Bioethics, said: the 
following: 
 
[i]n the history of humankind, animals and human species 
have been separated.  In this kind of procedure, you are 
mixing at a very intimate level animal eggs and human 
chromosomes, and you may begin to undermine the whole 
distinction between humans and animals . . . If that 
happens, it might also undermine human dignity and 
human rights. 130 
 
[38]  Prohibiting the creation of part-humans would merely avoid the issue 
of standing, however, rather than solving it.  The deeper problem is that 
species already do not have precise boundaries.131  The lack of precise 
boundaries between humans and some non-humans casts doubt on the idea 
that moral standing is based upon the supposed uniqueness of humans 
rather than, say, the more forceful justification that the authority that 
persons have over themselves makes them capable of conferring 
normativity on moral claims.132  
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[39]  The proposed rule would allow for the patenting of human materials, 
such as genes, proteins, isolated cells, totipotent stem cells, many non-
human animals, tissues, organs and early stage embryos since they cannot 
be considered to be persons.  In terms of mixed species, unlike the use of 
humanity as a criterion, it would be irrelevant for the purposes of 
patentability that the organism or other material contains human DNA 
except indirectly insofar as certain DNA expresses features that are tied to 
personhood.  With the proposed rule, persons would not be patentable 
regardless of their genetic makeup and, more abstractly, regardless of the 
kind of material from which they are formed (e.g. whether they are 
carbon-based).  Thus, if an animal that is used to grow a part-human organ 
is not a person, then that animal and its organs would be considered to be 
patentable.  On the other hand, should some animals which could be used 
to grow part- human organs be considered persons, they would not be 
considered patentable. 133  
 
IV. THE PATENTABILITY OF PART-HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 
 
[40]  In the United States, the purpose of granting patents of invention is 
to promote “the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries.”134  Similarly, in Canada, the purpose of patent 
law is to “advance research and development and to encourage broader 
economic activity” by granting exclusive rights to make, use and sell to be 
                                                                                                                         
 [T]he source of the normativity of moral claims must be 
found in the agent’s own will, in particular in the fact that the 
laws of morality are the laws of the agent’s own will and that 
its claims are ones she is prepared to make on herself. The 
capacity for self-conscious reflection about our actions confers 
on us a kind of authority over our-selves, and it is this 
authority which gives normativity to moral claims. 
CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 19-20 (Onora O’Neill ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). 
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 See, e.g., FELIPE FERNANDEZ-ARMESTO, HUMANKIND: A BRIEF HISTORY 1-2 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2004) (noting that it would be difficult to find any rational capacity that is not 
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used, inventions.135  In Europe, patent protection is “intended to encourage 
technical innovation . . . by recompensing the inventor for his creative 
work so as to stimulate inventive activity.”136  
 
[41]  Internationally, the broad scope of patentable subject matter is 
recognized in the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”), which notes in Article 27(1) that, subject to certain exceptions 
“patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve 
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”137  Although 
the scope of patentable subject matter is broad, internationally, there are 
exceptions permitted under TRIPS that could apply to part-humans.138  
The first exception provides that inventions may be excluded from 
patentability where the exclusion is necessary to protect ordre public (i.e. 
public policy) or morality, including the protection of human, animal or 
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment.139  
Thus, if part-humans were considered to be human beings or, more 
broadly, the patenting of part-humans was necessary to protect morality or 
public policy, then part-humans could be exempted if provided for under 
national law.140  Second, TRIPS provides explicitly that animals other than 
micro-organisms may be excluded from patenting, so part-human animals 
could be exempted under Article 27(3).141  In short, despite the broad 
scope of patentability of subject matter, WTO members have significant 
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latitude to exempt human and part-human materials from patentability in 
domestic legislation. 
 
[42]  The following section examines the extent to which human and part-
human materials are patentable in Canada, the United States, and Europe. 
 
A. THE APPROACH OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
[43]  According to American patent law, “[w]hoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”142  In 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the U.S. Supreme Court held by a five to four 
majority that 35 U.S.C. § 101 is to be interpreted broadly due to the 
deliberate use of “any” in conjunction with expansive terms such as 
“manufacture” and “composition of matter” found in the provision.143  The 
decision has been widely interpreted to have held that “anything under the 
sun that is made by man” is patentable.144  A broad and dynamic 
construction is supported according to the Supreme Court precisely 
because particular inventions were (by necessity) not contemplated by the 
drafter of patent legislation.145  
 
[44]  As a result, both living and non-living biological materials have been 
patented in the United States.146  According to the USPTO, in the area of 
living matter, the “test set down by the Court (in Chakrabarty) for 
patentable subject matter in this area is whether the living matter is the 
result of human intervention.”147  Similarly, non-living biological 
materials, including human DNA sequences have been the subject of 
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 35 U.S.C. §101. 
143
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
144
  There are some exceptions recognized, such as laws of nature, physical phenomena, 
and abstract ideas. See id. at 309. 
145
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patents.148  Although patents on human genes have been subject to 
criticism that they were not invented but merely discovered, the USPTO 
has responded that even if the genetic material had not been invented, its 
discovery can be the basis for obtaining a patent on the genetic 
composition that is isolated by human intervention from its natural state 
by purifying the gene, and separating it from other molecules naturally 
associated with it.149  So long as the application “discloses a specific, 
substantial, and credible utility for the claimed isolated and purified gene, 
the isolated and purified gene composition may be patentable.”150  
 
[45]  Furthermore, the patenting of human DNA is not considered by the 
USPTO to undermine the value of humanity nor to conflict with the legal 
prohibition against the ownership of human beings.151  While some 
criticized the patenting of human DNA by saying that the sequence of the 
human genome lies at the core of humanity and, consequently, that no 
person should be able to own or control something of that nature; the 
USPTO responded that “[p]atents do not confer ownership of genes, 
genetic information, or sequences.”152  Rather, patents simply grant a right 
to some to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing the patented subject matter for a limited time.153   
 
[46]  While isolated human biological material produced through human 
intervention has been held to be patentable, the USPTO has taken a 
different stance on human beings.  In April 1987, in response to the Board 
of Patent Appeals’ Ex Parte Allen154 decision, the USPTO issued a notice 
stating explicitly that it considered “nonnaturally occurring, nonhuman 
multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject 
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 Philadelphia, Health and Education Corporation Obtains U.S. Patent (Nucleic Acid 
Sequences and Polypeptide Sequences), 21 BIOTECH PAT. NEWS, Jan. 2007. 
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matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101.”155  However, “a claim directed 
to or including within its scope a human being will not be considered to be 
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101.  The grant of a limited, but 
exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited by the 
Constitution.”156  Presumably, this constitutional reference was to the 
prohibition of slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, which states that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction.”157  As Magnani has noted, “the Thirteenth 
Amendment cannot effectively and consistently be applied . . . until the 
courts adopt a workable definition of ‘human being,’”158  but perhaps an 
even greater problem with the USPTO reasoning is that the slavery 
provision is likely better construed as pertaining to persons rather than 
humans per se.159  
 
[47]  While the USPTO’s response to Ex parte Allen clarified its position 
regarding the patenting of nonhuman multicellular organisms, it did 
nothing to reconcile its treatment of isolated human biological material 
with that of human beings.  This weakness was exploited when, in 
December 18, 1997, Jeremy Rifkin, a prominent opponent of 
biotechnology, and Dr. Stuart Newman, a cellular biologist at New York 
Medical College, filed a patent application covering the production of 
human-animal chimeras by inserting the genetic material from one species 
into an embryo of another to create, in effect, “human-animal” chimeras 
                                                 
155
 See Donald J. Quigg, Patent and Trademark Office Notice: Animals- Patentability, 
1077 OFF. GAZETTE 24 (1987), available at 
http://www.justinhughes.net/patentingpeople/papers/Quigg.pdf.  This is now reflected in 
the USPTO, MANUAL, supra note 146, at § 2105, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2105.htm (last modified 
Dec. 28, 2007) 
 (emphasis added).  
156
 Id. 
157
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
158
 Magnani, supra note 123, at 450.  
159
 In fact, in a non-final rejection letter the USPTO examiner referred to the 1987 
statement of Quigg as saying that “. . . a patent would be difficult at best to apply to 
humans in view of the constitutional rights of human persons.”  Office Action Summary 
from USPTO Examiner Deborah Crouch to Applicant Stuart A. Newman (Jan. 29, 2003) 
(on file with author). 
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that “could contain anything from a minuscule proportion to a majority of 
human cells.”160  While Rifkin and Newman never intended to actually 
create the chimeras which they claimed,161 their objective in filing the 
application was to “raise these [ethical] issues before the public and the 
legal system in a particularly dramatic fashion.”162    
 
[48]  In Chakrabarty, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly rejected the 
relevance of ethical issues in determining the patentability of a genetically 
engineered bacterium capable of degrading multiple components of crude 
oil.163  While the petitioners in Chakrabarty argued that such an expansive 
interpretation of § 101 to include genetically engineered organisms might 
result in a “gruesome parade of horribles,” the Court justified its position 
by stating that, given the broad interpretation of what is patentable under § 
101, such “contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the 
political branches of the Government, the Congress and the Executive, and 
not to the courts.”164  Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that:  
 
[w]hat is more important is that we are without competence 
to entertain these arguments – either to brush them aside as 
fantasies generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on 
them.  The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high 
policy for resolution within the legislative process after the 
kind of investigation, examination, and study that 
legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot.  That 
process involves the balancing of competing values and 
                                                 
160
 Stuart A. Newman, The Legal Column: The Human Chimera Patent Initiative, 9 
LAHEY CLINIC MED. ETHICS 1, 4 (2002), available at 
www.nymc.edu/sanewman/PDFs/Lahey_Winter_2002.pdf.  See generally Stuart A. 
Newman, Chimeric Embryos and Animals Containing Human Cells, U.S. Patent App. 
No. 08/993,564. 
161
 Stuart A. Newman, My Attempt to Patent a Human-Animal Chimera, 27 
L’OBSERVATOIRE DE LA GÉNÉTIQUE (2006), available at 
http://www.ircm.qc.ca/bioethique/obsgenetique/zoom/zoom_06/z_no27_06/za_no27_06_
01.html. 
162
 Newman, supra note 104, at 455. 
163
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  
164
 Id. at 316-17.  See also Anna E. Lumelsky, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Gauging 
Congress's Response to Dynamic Statutory Interpretation by the Supreme Court, 39 
U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 658 (2005). 
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interests, which in our democratic system is the business of 
elected representatives. 165 
 
[49]  Notwithstanding that Chakrabarty countenanced the appropriateness 
of a legislative rather than a judicial balancing of values, the USPTO 
issued a non-final rejection of the Rifkin-Newman patent on March 18, 
1999 for the reason that, amongst others, “the claimed invention is not 
considered to be patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 because 
the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a whole 
embraces a human being.”166  Because Newman had failed to place limits 
on the percentage of human cells in the invention, it was found that the 
invention could embrace a human being.167  In a media advisory released 
in response to public outcry associated with the application, the USPTO 
relied upon the beneficial-utility doctrine, also known as the moral-utility 
doctrine, to suggest that Rifkin-Newman chimeras would not be 
patentable: “[i]t is the position of the [US]PTO that inventions directed to 
human/non-human chimera could, under certain circumstances, not be 
patentable because, among other things, they would fail to meet the public 
policy and morality aspects of the utility requirement.” 168 
 
[50]  The USPTO’s reference to the morality aspects of the utility 
requirement in its Media Advisory is to the moral utility doctrine which 
dates from the 1817 decision of Justice Story in Lowell v. Lewis.169  In that 
decision, he explained that “[a]ll that the law requires is that the invention 
                                                 
165
 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317.  
166
 Office Action Summary from USPTO Examiner Deborah Crouch to Applicant Stuart 
A. Newman, USPTO Non-Final Rejection Letter, at 2 (Mar. 1, 1999), available at 
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair (search for Patent Application 08/993,564, 
then follow “Image File Wrapper” tab).  For a further discussion of the other reasons for 
rejection, see Sean Coughlin, The Newman Application and the USPTO’s Unnecessary 
Response: Patentability of Humans and Human Embryos, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 
90 (2006); Rabin, supra note 125. 
167
 See Office Action Summary from USPTO Examiner D. Clark to Applicant Stuart A. 
Newman, USPTO Final Rejection Letter, at 7 (Oct. 29, 1999), available at 
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair (search for Patent Application 08/993,564, 
then follow “Image File Wrapper” tab). 
168
 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Media Advisory No. 98-6, Facts on Patenting Life 
Forms Having a Relationship to Humans  (Apr. 1, 1998) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98-06.htm. 
169
 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
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should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or 
sound morals of society.  The word ‘useful,’ therefore, is incorporated into 
the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral.”170  This reference 
is curious in a couple of respects.  First of all, when the utility guidelines 
were released in April 1998, Bruce Lehman, the USPTO’s Commissioner 
at the time, stated that “if an applicant presents a scientifically plausible 
use for the claimed invention, it will be sufficient to satisfy the utility 
requirement.”171  Second, the recent trend in American jurisprudence is to 
dismiss this doctrine.  In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,172 a case 
regarding the validity of a patent covering a beverage dispenser which has 
the capacity to deceive some members of the public, the court cast doubt 
on the broad applicability of the moral utility doctrine: 
 
The principle that inventions are invalid if they are 
principally designed to serve immoral or illegal purposes 
has not been applied broadly in recent years.  For example, 
years ago courts invalidated patents on gambling devices 
on the ground that they were immoral, but that is no longer 
the law . . . .  As the Supreme Court put the point more 
generally, “[c]ongress never intended that the patent laws 
should displace the police powers of the States, meaning by 
that term those powers by which the health, good order, 
peace and general welfare of the community are 
promoted.”173 
                                                 
170
 Id.  See also Benjamin D. Enerson, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive 
Inventions: The Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 
691 (2004). 
171
 See Kevin J. Dunleavy & Milan M. Vinnola, A Comparative Review of the Patenting 
of Biotechnological Inventions in the U.S. and Europe, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 65, 74 
(2000).  
172
 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
173
 Id. at 1366-68 (quoting Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 344, 347-48 (1880)).  
See also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966), in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
indicated that it did not accept Justice Story’s interpretation of “utility.”  Id.  The Court 
said,  
Justice Story’s language sheds little light on our subject. Narrowly read 
it does no more than compel us to decide whether the invention in 
question is ‘frivolous and insignificant’ – a query no easier of 
application than the one built into the statute. Read more broadly, so as 
to allow the patenting of any invention not positively harmful to 
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[51]  In the non-final rejection letter to Rifkin and Newman in January 
2003, the examiner restated the moral utility doctrine but did not decide 
whether the claimed invention was immoral, noting merely that “[t]he 
question of whether humans should be the subject of exclusive patent 
rights raises grave issues going to the core of what a ‘useful’ invention 
is.”174  Instead, the USPTO examiner stated that “[d]espite the breadth of 
these terms recognized in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 
(1980), the terms ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ would not 
have been regarded in ordinary parlance when § 101 was passed as 
possibly reflecting a Congressional intent to encompass human beings.”175 
 
[52]  It is odd that the Rifkin-Newman application would be rejected, in 
part, on grounds that appear to be out of step with the interpretive 
approach of Chakrabarty.  In fact, the decision of the USPTO may have 
been motivated more by the personal reasons of Lehman rather than the 
merits of the patent application.176  Commissioner Lehman was of the 
view that “every attempt to stop science has been characterized by 
darkness.”177  It is reported that Lehman acknowledged that he “was just 
deeply offended by anyone attempting to use the U.S. Patent Office to 
make a point, or to stop the advancement of science.  [He] refused to make 
it easy” for Newman.178  In using the USPTO to make his point, however, 
Lehman was doubly confused, for it not only buttressed Newman’s point 
that part-humans should not be patentable, but also increased the lack of 
clarity regarding the patentability of part-humans. 
                                                                                                                         
society, it places such a special meaning on the word ‘useful’ that we 
cannot accept it in the absence of evidence that Congress so intended.   
Id. 
174
 Office Action Summary from USPTO Examiner Deborah Crouch to Applicant Stuart 
A. Newman, USPTO Non-Final Rejection Letter, at 28 (Jan. 29, 2003), available at 
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair (search for Patent Application 08/993,564, 
then follow “Image File Wrapper” tab).  See also, Magnani, supra note 123, at 458.  
Magnani has maintained that even if a court subjected the Rifkin-Newman patent 
application to a moral utility test, it would be likely that the application would satisfy the 
test.  Id. 
175
 Office Action Summary (January Jan. 29, 2003), supra note 174, at 26.  
176
 Coughlin, supra note 166, at § 2.  The view appears naïve because it seems to imply 
that technology is value-neutral so that there can be no legitimate ethical or political 
issues concerning the development and use of new technology. 
177
 Id. at § 3.  
178
 Id.    
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[53]  At the same time that the Rifkin-Newman patent was being 
prosecuted, some legislators who were opposed to the patenting of cloned 
and genetically modified human embryos were concerned that, under U.S. 
patent law, such subject matter may be patentable under U.S. patent 
law.179  In order to prevent such patents from being granted, these 
legislators subverted the patent examination process by tying USPTO 
funding to a prohibition against patenting human organisms.  That is, even 
if the Director is required by patent legislation to issue a patent for the 
invention,180 the Director is prohibited from doing so by the Weldon 
amendment to the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act.181  Since the enactment, the federal 
appropriations legislation has continued to prohibit the use of funds for the 
issue of patents on human organisms.182  Thus, today, the USPTO’s 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure states:  “If the broadest 
reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a whole encompasses 
a human being, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 must be made 
indicating that the claimed invention is directed to nonstatutory subject 
matter.”183  
 
[54]  The prohibition against patenting humans is not easily applied to the 
issue of the patentability of part-human chimeras, transgenics or cybrids.  
Despite the prohibition, the USPTO has granted patents on some animals 
that contain human genetic material since such animals were not 
considered human beings.  One patent, for example, is for a transgenic 
                                                 
179
 See National Right to Life Coalition, Congress Bans Patents on Human Embryos; 
NRLC-backed Weldon Amendment Survives BIO attacks, available at 
http://www.nrlc.org/killing_embryos/Human_Patenting/Weldonamendmentsurvives.html 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
180
 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2002).  “The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the 
application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the 
applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the Commissioner shall issue a patent 
therefor.”  Id. 
181
 This act was introduced in 2004 by bioethically conservative Congressman David 
Weldon.  National Right to Life Coalition, supra note 179, at ¶ 5.   
182
 The current Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 2007 contains the following provision: “(Sec. 618) Prohibits the use of any of the 
funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this Act to issue patents on claims 
directed to or encompassing a human organism.” Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2007, H.R. 5672, 109th Cong. § 618 (2006).  
183
 USPTO, MANUAL, supra note 146. 
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swine having a transgene encoding a human HLA-DQ or HLA-DR 
protein.184  Another claims a pig genetically engineered to express the 
hDAF, which may prevent HAR after xenotransplantation into humans.185  
Still another application claims a pig and its organs and cells, where a 
preferred embodiment of the transgene encodes a human protein.186  
Recently, a claim for organs, tissues or cells wherein the cells, tissues or 
organs are modified to express one or more human complement regulatory 
proteins was accepted.187  
 
[55]  At the same time it has granted patents on such part-human 
materials, the USPTO denies that it has any principled way of deciding 
which animal-human combinations are patentable.   As Deputy 
Commissioner John Doll commented at the time of the denial of the 
Rifkin-Newman patent:  “I don’t think anyone knows in terms of crude 
percentages [of human genetic material] how to differentiate between 
humans and nonhumans.”188  On this matter, President George W. Bush 
and many members of Congress sought to definitively prevent the creation 
and patenting of certain chimeras through legislation, with the Human 
Chimera Prohibition Act of 2005.189  The Act expressly stated its ethical 
concerns that some chimeras blur the lines between human and animal, 
male and female, parent and child, and one individual and another 
individual, threatening the respect for human dignity and the integrity of 
the human species.190  The Act would have prohibited the creation of 
various types of chimeras (including a human embryo into which a non-
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 U.S. Patent No. 6,639,122 (filed Sept. 19, 2000) (issued Oct. 28, 2003).  
185
 See U.S. Patent No. 6,825,395 (filed Apr. 5, 2000) (issued Nov. 30, 2004). 
186
 U.S. Patent No. 7,141,716 (filed Aug. 20, 2002) (issued Nov. 28, 2006). 
187
 U.S. Patent No. 7,166,278 (filed Apr. 29, 2002) (issued Jan. 23, 2007). 
188
 Rick Weiss, U.S. Denies Patent for a Too-Human Hybrid, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 
2005, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19781-
2005Feb12.html. 
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 Human Chimera Prohibition Act of 2006, S. 1373, 109th Cong. (2005); Human 
Chimera Prohibition Act of 2005, S. 659, 109th Cong. (2005).  U.S. President Bush said 
in his 2006 State of the Union Address: “[t]onight I ask you to pass legislation to prohibit 
the most egregious abuses of medical research: human cloning in all its forms, creating or 
implanting embryos for experiments, creating human-animal hybrids, and buying, selling, 
or patenting human embryos.”  George W. Bush, U.S. President, 2006 State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html. 
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human cell, or any component part of a non-human cell, was inserted); but 
it was not passed by Congress.191     
 
[56]  The problem of applying the rule against patenting humans also 
arises in the case of the patentability of embryonic stem cells containing 
human DNA, whether containing only human, or containing non-human 
DNA, as do stem cells extracted from a part- human cybrid embryo.  On 
this matter, in January 1999, Q. Todd Dickinson, the then Acting 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, stated that it was the position of 
the USPTO that purified and isolated stem cell lines were patentable 
subject-matter under 35 U.S.C.  § 101, just as is the case for other 
biologically pure compositions.192  While Dickinson’s blanket statement 
would seem to apply to human totipotent stem cells, which could in 
principle develop into a human being, more recent pronouncements 
interpreting the Weldon amendment have made it clear that there is a 
USPTO policy against granting a patent on human beings at any stage of 
development.193  In 2003, then USPTO Director Rogan, who was a 
President G.W. Bush appointee, wrote:  “[t]he USPTO understands the 
Weldon Amendment to provide unequivocal congressional backing for the 
longstanding USPTO policy of refusing to grant any patent containing a 
claim that encompasses any member of the species Homo sapiens at any 
stage of development . . . including a human embryo or human fetus.”194  
In addition, the USPTO policy “applies regardless of the manner and 
mechanism used to bring a human organism into existence (e.g., somatic 
                                                 
191
 See generally id. 
192
 Statement from Q. Todd Dickinson, Acting Assistant Secretary Sec’y of Commerce 
and Acting Commissioner Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks before the Subcommittee 
Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services., Education Edu. and Related Agencies 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee Comm. (Jan. 12, 1999), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/bulletin/stemcell.pdf. 
193
  It has long been USPTO practice to reject any claim in a patent 
application that encompasses a human life-form at any stage of 
development, including a human embryo or human fetus . . . [The 
policy applies] regardless of the manner and mechanism used to bring a 
human organism into existence (e.g. somatic cell nuclear transfer, in 
vitro fertilization, parthenogenesis).   
Letter from James E. Rogan, Under Secretary Sec’y and DirectorDir., USPTO to U.S. 
Senate Committee Comm. on Appropriations (received Nov. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.nrlc.org/killing_embryos/Human_Patenting/patentletter112003.html. 
194
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cell nuclear transfer, in vitro fertilization, parthenogenesis).”195  Although 
a human totipotent cell might be considered to be a stage of development 
of a human, it is reported that negotiators from the Senate and House 
agreed that the prohibition against patenting genetically engineered human 
embryos, fetuses and human beings would not extend to human stem cells, 
genes, cells, tissue, and “other biological products.”196  
 
[57]  The patentability of human totipotent stem cells appeared to be 
confirmed when, on March 13, 2001, James Thomson was issued a patent 
that specifically claimed primate (including human) embryonic stem 
cells.197  In Thomson’s invention, “[p]rimate ES cells of the present 
invention are pluripotent.  By ‘pluripotent’ we mean that the cell has the 
ability to develop into any cell derived from the three main germ cell 
layers or an embryo itself.”198  In other words, the human embryonic stem 
cells claimed were not merely pluripotent, but also totipotent.  While the 
claims in this patent were recently rejected upon re-examination, they 
were not rejected on the basis of its subject matter but on the basis of that 
the invention was anticipated.199  By 2004, approximately thirty-eight 
patents had been issued with claims to embryonic stem cells or processes 
encompassing human products or processes.200  Within some of these 
                                                 
195
 Id. 
196
 Kaisernetwork.org, National Politics & Policy, Lawmakers Reach Agreement on 
Appropriations Bill Language Barring Patents on “Human Organisms,” available at 
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=2&DR_ID=21029 (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
197
 This is one of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (“WARF”) patents.  U.S. 
Patent No. 6,200,806 (filed June 26, 1998) (issued Mar. 13, 2001). 
198
 Id. (emphasis added). 
199
 See Kevin E. Noonan, WARF Stem Cell Patent Claims Rejected in Re-Examination 
(Apr. 3, 2007), available at 
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/2007/04/warf_stem_cell_.html (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2008). 
200
 See generally Raymond R. Mandra & Alicia A. Russo, Stem Cells and Patenting and 
Related Regulatory Issues: A U.S. Perspective, 7 BIO-SCI. L. REV. 143, 144-45 (2004-
2005), available at 
http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/publications/pubItem.cfm?pubID=333; Enca Martin-
Rendon and Derek J. Blake, Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells, RECENT PATS. ON 
DNA & GENE SEQUENCES 2007, 1, 25-34, available at 
http://www.bentham.org/dnag/samples/dnag1-1/Martin-Rendon.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 
2008) (describing recent patents related to pluripotent stem cells and pluripotency genes, 
and technology developed to manipulate the genetic material of those stem cells).   
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patents are claims to totipotent stem cells.  For instance, the patent issued 
to Geron Corporation for “[m]ethods and materials for the growth of 
primate-derived primordial stem cells in feeder-free culture” stands out.201  
It claims a cellular composition comprising undifferentiated primate 
primordial cells, which includes both pluripotent and totipotent primate 
stem cells, but does not exclude human primate stem cells.202  It appears 
then that, in the United States, human and part-human totipotent stem cells 
are patentable despite the fact that human beings at any stage of 
development are not patentable.  The fact that, as will be discussed, 
Europe and Canada have concluded that human totipotent stem cells are 
unpatentable on the basis that they are stages of human development 
demonstrated the difficulty of arriving at a principled rule against 
patenting human beings. 
 
B. THE CANADIAN APPROACH 
 
[58]  The Canadian Patent Act defines “invention” as “any new and useful 
art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement in any art, process, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter.”203  As is the case in the United States, the 
Canadian Patent Office has granted patents on isolated non-living 
biological materials, including human biological materials.204  In Canada, 
however, all higher life forms, including humans, are unpatentable.205  
                                                 
201
 U.S. Patent No. 6,800,480 (filed Aug. 29, 2000) (issued Oct. 5, 2004).  It might be 
argued that the patentability of totipotent stem cells is purely academic since pluripotent 
cells might be all that is needed for therapeutic purposes.  This remains to be seen.  
Meanwhile, the description maintains that “. . .  it is desirable to maintain cultures of 
totipotent primordial stem cells for extended periods or indefinitely. The ability to 
maintain cultures of undifferentiated, totipotent, primate-derived primordial stem cells for 
long periods facilitates the use of such cells for therapeutic purposes.”  Id. at 53. 
202
 Id. 
203
 Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 2 (1985).  Under the Canadian Patent Act, “[t]he 
Commissioner shall grant a patent for an invention to the inventor or the inventor’s legal 
representative if an application for the patent in Canada is filed in accordance with this 
Act and all other requirements for the issuance of a patent under this Act are met.”  Id. at 
§ 27(1). 
204
 See GOLD, supra note 10; E. Richard Gold, Human Gene Patents: Recent 
Developments (2002), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/cbac-
cccb.nsf/vwapj/Research-2002_Gold-Developments-Final_e.pdf. 
205
 See Harvard College, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 2002 SCC 76 ¶155 (Can.). 
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While the Supreme Court of Canada found that the categories of subject 
matter provided in patent legislation were sufficiently broad to include 
unforeseen technologies, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in Chakrabarty, it 
held that legislators intended that the listed categories were exhaustive so 
as to exclude subject matter not included in the categories provided. 206  
 
[59]  In particular, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Harvard College 
v. Canada that higher life forms are not patentable because they are 
neither manufactures nor compositions of matter under the Patent Act.207  
The Supreme Court of Canada arrived at this conclusion while considering 
the patentability of non-human transgenic mammals, which were 
genetically engineered to give the host organism a heightened 
susceptibility to the development of cancer.208  One of the claims, for 
which the case is popularly known, was for a genetically engineered 
mouse that promised to be particularly useful as a tool for cancer 
research.209  After dismissing the idea that the claimed invention could be 
an “art, process, or machine,” the Supreme Court of Canada applied its 
interpretive principles to determine whether the oncomouse (as well as 
other organisms in the claims) was a “manufacture or composition of 
matter” based upon: (i) the words of the Act; (ii) the scheme of the Act; 
(iii) the object of the Act; and (iv) the intention of Parliament and related 
legislation.210  
 
[60]  In examining the meaning of the terms in issue, the Supreme Court 
of Canada noted that English Courts had defined “manufacture” as 
“something made by the hands of man,”211 but it found that “a complex 
life form such as a mouse or a chimpanzee cannot easily be characterized 
as ‘something made by the hands of man.’”212  It was also not a 
composition of matter, which the Court defined as “[a] substance or 
                                                 
206
 See id. at ¶ 158.  
207
 See Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 2 (1985). 
208
 See Harvard College, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 at ¶ 1. 
209
 The genetic manipulation of the murine genome in this case was accomplished by 
Philip Leder (of Harvard University) and Timothy Stewart (of Genentech).  See Emir Aly 
Crowne Mohammed, Cat in the Hat, a Mouse in the House – Comparative Perspectives 
on Harvard Mouse, 18 I.P.J. 169, 170 (2004). 
210
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211
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preparation formed by combination or mixture of various ingredients,”213 
since “the process by which a fertilized egg becomes an adult mouse is a 
complex process, elements of which require no human intervention.”214  
Moreover, since “animal life forms have numerous unique qualities that 
transcend the particular matter of which they are composed [it is difficult]. 
. . to conceptualize higher life forms as mere ‘composition[s] of 
matter.’”215  Justice Bastarache, writing for the majority, noted further that 
“[a]lthough some in society may hold the view that higher life forms are 
mere ‘composition[s] of matter,’ the phrase does not fit well with common 
understandings of human and animal life.”216  Further, the object of the 
Act, the intent of the legislators, and the scheme of both the Patent Act and 
the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, S.C.., ch. P-14.6, support such a 
conclusion.217  Higher life forms – including human beings, part-human 
chimeras, and transgenics – are therefore unpatentable in Canada.218  
 
[61]  In spite of the Supreme Court of Canada ruling against the 
patentability of higher life forms, such materials are protected indirectly 
under Canadian law.  In Monsanto v. Schmeiser, the Supreme Court of 
Canada ruled that cultivation of a whole canola plant amounted to the use 
of its patented parts: its chimeric genes and cells.219  Hence, the Court 
found that the use of a genetically modified canola plant by Schmeiser was 
an infringement of Monsanto’s patent rights in the modified genes and 
cells contained in the plant.  The canola plant had been modified to be 
resistant to Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide.220  The Court held that the 
possession of the patented genes contained in the canola plants by 
Schmeiser were presumed to be a use of the plant.221  Schmeiser objected, 
                                                 
213
 Id. at ¶ 162 
214
 Id. 
215
 Id. at ¶ 163.  
216
 Id. at ¶ 163 (emphasis added).  
217
 See id. at ¶¶ 167-96. 
218
 See id at ¶ 166.  
219
 See Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34 ¶ 1 
(Can).  
220
 See id. at ¶ 5.  
221
 See id. at ¶¶ 83-87.  The Court gave the following Lego blocks analogy:  
By analogy, then, the law holds that a defendant infringes a patent 
when the defendant manufactures, seeks to use, or uses a patented part 
that is contained within something that is not patented, provided the 
patented part is significant or important.  In the case at bar, the patented 
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asserting that by not spraying Roundup on the canola plants and having no 
intention to do so in his commercial operations, he had rebutted this 
presumption; the Court disagreed: “[t]he farmer benefits from that 
advantage from the outset: if there is reason to spray in the future, the 
farmer may proceed to do so.”222  In fact, the Court went as far as to say 
that the potential use of the gene is itself a benefit, analogous to the 
standby utility of a fire extinguisher hanging on a wall.223  Hence, 
“[w]hether or not a farmer sprays with Roundup herbicide, cultivating 
canola containing the patented genes and cells provides stand-by 
utility.”224  Schmeiser could have rebutted the presumption by quickly 
removing the canola plants and by showing the concentration of such 
plants was consistent with unsolicited “blow-by” canola, but he did 
neither.225  On the basis of the reasoning in Monsanto, it appears that 
higher animal life forms – presumably not including humans – can be 
protected given the existence of patented genes or cells comprising 
them.226  
 
[62]  The problem of distinguishing between higher life forms and lower 
life forms mirrors the problem of distinguishing between human and non-
human.  CIPO considers the distinction as one of degree of complexity, 
namely, the distinction between multicellular and unicellular organisms. 
227  The Canadian MPOP considers animals (including humans), plants, 
seeds, and mushrooms “higher life forms.”228  Lower life forms, which are 
                                                                                                                         
genes and cells are not merely a “part” of the plant; rather, the patented 
genes are present throughout the genetically modified plant and the 
patented cells compose its entire physical structure.  In that sense, the 
cells are somewhat analogous to Lego blocks: if an infringing use were 
alleged in building a structure with patented Lego blocks, it would be 
no bar to a finding of infringement that only the blocks were patented 
and not the entire structure.  If anything, the fact that the Lego structure 
could not exist independently of the patented blocks would strengthen 
the claim, underlining the significance of the patented invention to the 
whole product, object, or process.  
Id. at ¶ 42. 
222
 Id. at ¶ 84. 
223
 See id. at ¶ 47. 
224
 Id. at ¶ 84 
225
 See id. at ¶ 86. 
226
 This includes totipotent stem cells that contained patented DNA.  
227
 See CIPO, MANUAL, supra note 10, at § 12.04.01. 
228
 Id. 
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patentable, include microscopic algae, moulds and yeasts, bacteria, 
protozoa, viruses, cells in culture, transformed cell lines, and 
hybridomas.229  At the same time, however, human genetic material and 
human cell lines are patentable subject matter.230  Nevertheless, based 
upon this distinction, no part-human higher life forms, whether human-
animal chimeras, transgenics, or hybrids are patentable in Canada. 
Monsanto may indirectly protect genetically modified part-humans, 
provided they are not considered human beings.   
 
[63]  As mentioned, human development illustrates the problem of 
distinguishing between higher and lower life forms.  If higher life forms 
are to be identified with multicellular life forms and lower life forms with 
unicellular life forms, then despite the fact that an isolated fertilized egg of 
a higher life form will naturally develop into a higher life form, the 
isolated fertilized egg is, based upon the premises supplied by the MPOP, 
patentable by virtue of being a lower life form.  The same conclusion 
follows if the fertilized egg is an animal-human combination, such as a 
cybrid.  This conclusion is a generalization of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s finding concerning the oncomouse: 
 
[f]urther, all members of the Court in Harvard Mouse noted 
in obiter that a fertilized, genetically altered oncomouse 
egg would be patentable subject matter, regardless of its 
ultimate anticipated development into a mouse (at para. 3, 
per Binnie J. for the minority; at para. 162, per Bastarache 
J. for the majority).231  
 
Since fertilized eggs are totipotent in the sense that they can develop into a 
higher life form in the right environment, this suggests that totipotency is 
not a bar to patentability in Canada, including the patentability of 
totipotent stem cells.   
 
[64]  Nevertheless, the CIPO confirms that animals at any stage of 
development, from fertilized eggs on, as well as totipotent stem cells, are 
unpatentable in its view because they could develop into an entire animal: 
                                                 
229
 Id. 
230
 See CAMPBELL & BERGERON, supra note 10.  
231
 Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34 ¶ 23 (Can.). 
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[t]he Patent Office takes the position that animals at any 
stage of development, from fertilized eggs on, are higher 
life forms and are thus not patentable subject matter under 
section 2 of the Patent Act.  Totipotent stem cells, which 
have the same potential as fertilized eggs to develop into an 
entire animal, are considered to be equivalents of fertilized 
eggs and are thus higher life forms and are not patentable 
subject matter . . . .232  
 
Embryonic, multipotent and pluripotent stem cells, which do not have the 
potential to develop into an entire animal, are patentable subject matter.233 
 
[65]  CIPO’s position clearly contradicts the view taken by the Supreme 
Court of Canada that a fertilized egg, which is totipotent, is patentable 
despite its potential for developing into a fully developed higher life 
form.234  The contradiction between CIPO and the Supreme Court of 
Canada regarding whether a totipotent stem cell is patentable is 
symptomatic of the difficulty involved in making a principled distinction 
between the concepts of higher and lower life form.  
 
[66]  The CIPO Office Practice Regarding Fertilized Eggs, Stem Cells, 
Organs and Tissues is strikingly similar to the 2003 U.K. Practice Notice 
on Inventions Involving Human Embryonic Stem Cells, except for the 
                                                 
232
 CIPO, OFFICE PRACTICE, supra note 14.  
233
 Id. 
234
 See id.  In its recent draft update to the CIPO’s Manual, the CIPO has responded to 
this argument, at least implicitly, by modifying the distinction between higher and lower 
life forms in the case of totipotent stem cells and fertilized animal eggs. It states at § 
17.02.01a:  
For the purposes of section 2 of the Patent Act, life forms have in view 
of jurisprudence been divided into lower life forms (statutory) and 
higher life forms (non-statutory). With the exception of fertilized eggs 
and totipotent stem cells, the distinction between lower and higher life 
forms is whether the life form is unicellular (lower) or multicellular 
(higher).”  
CIPO, MANUAL, supra note 10. 
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substitution in the Canadian policy of “higher life form” for “human.”235  
The U.K. Practice Notice reads: 
 
[h]uman totipotent cells have the potential to develop into 
an entire human body.  In view of this potential, such cells 
are not patentable because the human body at the various 
stages of its formation and development is excluded from 
patentability by Paragraph 3(a) of Schedule A2 to the 
Patents Act 1977.  The Office will therefore not grant 
patents for human totipotent cells.236 
 
CIPO would likely deny that it has adopted the U.K. approach and for 
good reason.  Under European patent law, the prohibition against 
patenting totipotent cells is explicitly based upon a broad prohibition 
against patenting a human body at every stage of development.237  In 
contrast to Canada, the European prohibition is further grounded in the 
broad legal prohibition against patenting when it is against public policy 
or morality.238  Neither of these prohibitions explicitly exists in patent 
legislation in Canada. This leaves open the question as to the grounds for 
CIPO’s conclusions.  If ethical concerns did not ground its reasoning, then 
it may have implicitly based its rationale on a preformationist theory of 
development.  As discussed above, however, the preformationist theory of 
development is not generally accepted in the biological community.239 
 
[67]  In its reasoning, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly held that 
ethical and policy grounds could not be used to limit the type of subject 
matter eligible for patenting under the Patent Act.240  Nevertheless, in the 
Court’s reasoning, the principle that humans are not patentable was a 
premise in its conclusion that higher life forms are not patentable.  To 
begin with, in Harvard College, while the majority held that an 
                                                 
235
 See United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office, Inventions Involving Human 
Embryonic Stem Cells, available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patent/p-decisionmaking/p-
law/p-law-notice/p-law-notice-stemcells.htm. 
236
 Id. 
237
 See discussion infra Part IV.C.  
238
 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
239
 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
240
 See Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34 ¶ 93 
(Can); Harvard College, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 2002 SCC 76 ¶ 155 (Can).    
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oncomouse was not a composition of matter, it also stated that “[e]ven if a 
higher life form could, scientifically, be regarded as a ‘composition of 
matter,’ the scheme of the Act indicate[d] that the patentability of higher 
life forms was not contemplated by Parliament.”241  It gave the following 
reason:  
 
[o]wing to the fact that the patenting of higher life forms is 
a highly contentious and complex matter that raises serious 
practical, ethical and environmental concerns that the Act 
does not contemplate, I conclude that the Commissioner 
was correct to reject the patent application.242   
 
[68]  Furthermore, in considering the concerns referred to in the preceding 
quotation, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that “the most significant 
issue . . . is the patentability of human life.”243  In particular, in defense of 
the distinction between higher and lower life forms, the Supreme Court of 
Canada invoked the principle that human life is not patentable:  
 
[t]he distinction between lower and higher life forms, 
though not explicit in the Act, is nonetheless defensible on 
the basis of common sense differences between the two.  
Perhaps more importantly, there appears to be a consensus 
that human life is not patentable; yet this distinction is also 
not explicit in the Act.  If the line between lower and higher 
life forms is indefensible and arbitrary, so too is the line 
between human beings and other higher life forms.244 
 
[69]  While the Supreme Court of Canada regarded CIPO’s distinction 
between higher and lower life forms as defensible – namely, that between 
unicellular and multicellular organisms245 – and did not seek to alter the 
distinction,246 it was willing to grant that the line could be drawn 
                                                 
241
 Harvard College, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 at ¶ 155. 
242
 Id. at ¶ 155 (emphasis added). 
243
 Id. at ¶ 175. 
244
 Id. at ¶ 199.  Justice Bastarache, writing for the majority, noted that “[w]hatever 
justification is used to support the assumption, there seems to be little debate that human 
life is not patentable.”  Id. at ¶ 177. 
245
 See CIPO, MANUAL, supra note 10, at § 12.04.01. 
246
 See Harvard College, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 at ¶ 199.  
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 4 
 
 50
elsewhere, such as between sentient and non-sentient creatures.  In that 
respect, the majority remarked that “if sentience is the determining factor 
that renders a higher life form incapable of receiving patent protection, 
then the current line between higher and lower life forms is misplaced.”247  
It is worth pointing out that, in the reasoning of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the distinction between higher and lower life forms was not 
supported solely by the prohibition against patenting humans, but also 
based upon the presence or absence of features possessed by paradigmatic 
examples of higher life forms.248  For animals, such features include “the 
capacity to display emotion and complexity of reaction and to direct 
behaviour in a manner that is not predictable as stimulus and response,”249 
as well as the persistence of identity through material and genetic 
change.250    
 
[70]  In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada raised doubts about the 
grounds for a biologically-based distinction in the context of human 
transplantation, alluding – albeit haphazardly – to the idea that the proper 
distinction between patentable and unpatentable is based upon 
personhood.  For example, the Supreme Court of Canada suggested that a 
human organ may be patentable because human tissues and organs are not 
protected under section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.251  The 
Court noted that, “[a]pplicants may also seek to patent human tissues and 
organs rather than the entire person, in which case s. 7 may not apply . . . 
.”
252
  While suggesting a rationale under section 7 of the Charter253 for 
permitting the patenting of human organs and tissues, but not persons, it 
still maintained that “it is not an appropriate judicial function for the 
                                                 
247
 Id. at ¶ 204.  
248
 The fact that animal life forms have numerous unique qualities that transcend the 
particular matter of which they are composed makes it difficult to conceptualize higher 
life forms as mere “composition[s] of matter.”  Id. at ¶ 163.  
249
 Id. at ¶ 204. 
250
 See id. at ¶ 163. 
251
 See Charter, supra note 97, at § 7. 
252
  Harvard College, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 at ¶ 180 (emphasis added).  
253
 See Charter, supra note 97, at § 7.  Presumably, an entire person cannot be patented in 
Canada in virtue of § 40, which states that “[w]henever the Commissioner is satisfied that 
an applicant is not by law entitled to be granted a patent, he shall refuse the application 
and, by registered letter addressed to the applicant or his registered agent, notify the 
applicant of the refusal and of the ground or reason therefore.”  Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-
4, § 40 (1985). 
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courts to create an exception from patentability for human life given that 
such an exception requires one to consider both what is human and which 
aspects of human life should be excluded.”254 
 
[71]  The Supreme Court of Canada even raised the issue as to how to 
distinguish between the patentability of humans and part-human materials 
where such materials could be used for transplantation.  It noted in 
Harvard College that, 
 
[t]he patenting of body parts raises yet another issue: the 
increasingly blurred line between human beings and other 
higher life forms.  In the new field of xenotransplantation, 
human genes are introduced into mammals such as pigs to 
make the animals’ organs more acceptable to the human 
body for the purposes of organ transplantation.  As noted 
by the intervener Animal Alliance of Canada, at para. 68 of 
its submissions, this scientific development calls into 
question the once clear distinction between human and 
animal life:  
 
The pig receives human genes.  The human receives pig 
organs.  Where does the pig end and the human begin?  
How much DNA does it take before one becomes the 
other?  The answer to these questions, once ridiculous and 
offensive, may now just be a matter of degree.255 
 
                                                 
254
 Id. at ¶ 181.  Like many other commentators, the Supreme Court of Canada 
equivocates between person and human.  A good example is found in R. v. Clay, where 
the Court says “. . . the liberty right within s. 7 is thought to touch the core of what it 
means to be an autonomous human being blessed with dignity and independence in 
“matters that can properly be characterized as fundamentally or inherently personal.”  R. 
v. Clay, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735, 2003 SCC 75 ¶ 31 (Can.) (emphasis added).  
255
 Harvard College, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 at ¶ 180.  On CIPO’s account, no parts of higher 
life forms are patentable.  It says: “[f]urther, the Office takes the position that organs and 
tissues are not compositions of matter for the purposes of the definition of invention 
under section 2 of the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 and are therefore not patentable 
subject matter.  Organs and tissues are created by complex processes, elements of which 
require no human intervention, and do not consist of ingredients or substances that have 
been combined or mixed together by a person.”  See CIPO, OFFICE PRACTICE, supra note 
14. 
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While the patenting of part-human higher life forms and their parts is 
prohibited in Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada did not attempt to 
draw its own distinction between patentable and non-patentable part-
humans, concluding that “a judicially crafted exception from patentability 
for human beings does not adequately address issues such as what defines 
a human being and whether parts of the human body as opposed to the 
entire person would be patentable.”256  Justice Bastarache, writing for the 
Court, noted that “in my view, this Court does not possess the institutional 
competence to deal with issues of this complexity, which presumably will 
require Parliament to engage in public debate, a balancing of competing 
societal interests and intricate legislative drafting.”257 Unfortunately, it 
appears that the Parliament of Canada does not want to deal with these 
issues yet. 
 
C. THE APPROACH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
[72]  There is no uniform answer to the question of which part-human 
biological materials are patentable in Europe due to the jurisdictional 
complexities of the European patent system.  Patents on inventions in 
Europe may be granted by either national patent offices or by the 
European Patent Office (“EPO”).258  The EPO, which operates within the 
legal framework of the European Patent Convention,259 grants a bundle of 
national patent rights since a European Community patent does not yet 
exist.  National patent offices, on the other hand, operate under their 
respective national law, which implements the Biotechnology Directive, 
key European legislation concerning the patenting of biotechnology.260  
Although the EPO is not bound by the Biotechnology Directive, in June 
1999 the Administrative Council of the EPO amended the Implementing 
Regulations to the EPC to include a new section on biotechnological 
inventions incorporating several key Articles of the Biotechnology 
                                                 
256
 Harvard College, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 at ¶ 206 (emphasis added).  
257
 Id. at ¶ 183. 
258
 See generally MILLS, supra note 16. 
259
 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, EUR. PAT. CONVENTION, available at 
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ma1.html [hereinafter EPC]. 
260
 AURORA PLOMER, STEM CELL PATENTS: EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND ETHICS 
REPORT 30-31, 84 (2006), available at 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/StemCellProject/reports.htm. 
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Directive. 261  Nonetheless, different decisions may be made by the EPO 
and national patent authorities based upon the same criteria for 
patentability. 
 
[73]  As in the United States and Canada, in Europe the scope of 
patentable subject matter is broad.  Article 52(1) EPC states that 
“European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are 
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an 
inventive step.”262  The Biotechnology Directive makes it clear that “. . . 
inventions which are new, which involve an inventive step and which are 
susceptible of industrial application shall be patentable even if they 
concern a product consisting of or containing biological material or a 
process by means of which biological material is produced, processed or 
used.”263  While exceptions to Article 52(1) of the EPC have been 
narrowly construed in several cases264 the scope of patentability of 
biological materials containing human DNA remains unclear in some 
respects.   
 
[74]  In respect of the patenting of isolated parts of the human body, the 
Biotechnology Directive and EPC each provide that: “[a]n element 
                                                 
261
 Rules 23b-23e of the Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents of October 5, 1973, as last amended by Decision of the Administrative 
Council of the European Patent Organisation of December 9, 2004 [hereinafter 
Implementing Regulations].  Please note that a revised version of the European Patent 
Convention [hereinafter EPC] entered into force on December 13, 2007.  The Rules cited 
in this paper are to the earlier version to avoid confusion.  A list that cross-references the 
old and new numbering is available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-
texts/html/epc/2000/e/ma2.html. 
262
 Subsection 52(2) provides that: “[t]he following in particular shall not be regarded as 
inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1: (a) discoveries, scientific theories and 
mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for 
performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers; 
(d) presentations of information.”  Id. 
263
 Article 3(1) Biotechnology Directive, supra note 10 and 52(1) EPC, supra note 261.  
Article 2(1), Biotechnology Directive, defines “biological materials” as any material 
containing genetic information and capable of reproducing itself or being reproduced in a 
biological system. 
264
 In Harvard/Oncomouse, 1990 O.J. EPO 476 (T 0019/90 - 3.3.2), available at 
http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t900019ep1.htm, the EPO Board of 
Appeals held at 4:5 that “[a]ny such exception [to Article 52(1) EPC] must, as repeatedly 
pointed out by the Boards of Appeal, be narrowly construed.”  Id. 
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isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a 
technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, 
may constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of that element 
is identical to that of a natural element.”265  The Biotechnology Directive 
further provides that,  
 
[such an element] is not excluded from patentability since it 
is, for example, the result of technical processes used to 
identify, purify and classify it and to reproduce it outside 
the human body, techniques which human beings alone are 
capable of putting into practice and which nature is 
incapable of accomplishing by itself .266   
 
Furthermore, the Biotechnology Directive notes that isolating human 
elements and utilizing them for medical treatment – including, 
presumably, transplantation – is to be encouraged by the patent system.267  
If these were the only criteria for patentability, then a wide variety of part-
human biological material would be patentable, including isolated human 
fertilized eggs, isolated totipotent stem cells, as well as isolated transgenic 
or chimeric materials, such as a cow-human cybrid.  
 
[75]  Despite its prima facie broad approach to the patentability of part-
human biological materials, European patent legislation contains an 
explicit morality provision that prohibits the granting of patents on 
inventions whose commercial exploitation is immoral or against ordre 
public.268  Moreover, while both Canadian and U.S. patent authorities 
prohibit the granting of patents on human beings at any stage of 
development inferring the principle from patent law, in Europe, there is an 
explicit prohibition on granting patents on human bodies at any stage of 
development.  “The human body, at the various stages of its formation and 
development, and the simple discovery of one of its elements, including 
the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable 
                                                 
265
 Article 5(2), Biotechnology Directive, supra note 10, and 23(e)(2) EPC, supra note 
261. 
266
 Recital 21, Biotechnology Directive, supra note 10. 
267
 Recital 17, Biotechnology Directive, supra note 10. 
268
 Article 6(1), Biotechnology Directive, supra note 10; Article 53(a) EPC, supra note 
261 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 4 
 
 55
inventions.” 269  This version of the rule against patenting humans suffers 
from many of the same problems as the U.S. rule against patenting 
humans.  Each appears to presume a form of genetic preformationism that 
is out of step with biological theory.  Furthermore, each leaves open the 
amount of DNA necessary for a part-human chimera or transgenic animal 
to be human and whether human or part-human embryonic stem cells are 
patentable. 
 
[76]  Consider the question as to whether isolated human embryonic stem 
cells are patentable.  It has been thought that Rule 23(e)(1) EPC, 
prohibiting the patenting of human bodies, need not be considered in order 
to answer this question, since the EPC specifically prohibits the patenting 
of the “uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes.”270  
The scope of this prohibition was considered in light of opposition to 
European patent No. EP 0695351, titled “Isolation, selection and 
propagation of animal transgenic stem cells[,]” which describes a method 
of using genetic engineering to isolate stem cells - including embryonic 
stem cells - from more differentiated cells in a cell culture (the “Edinburgh 
patent”).271  The European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies (“EGE”) had opined that modified human embryonic stem 
cell lines for specific industrial application fulfil the legal requirements for 
patentability.272  However, the Opposition Division of the European Patent 
                                                 
269
 Article 5(1), Biotechnology Directive, supra note 10; Rule 23(e)(1) EPC, supra note 
261. 
270
 Rule 23(d)(c) EPC, supra note 258; Article 6(2)(c) Biotechnology Directive, supra 
note 10.  
271
 See Press Release, European Patent Office, “"Edinburgh"” Patent Limited After 
European Patent Office Opposition Hearing (July 24, 2002), available at  
http://www.epo.org/aboutus/press/releases/archive/2002/24072002.html (last visited Apr. 
6, 2008).  
272
 EGE said at p. 15: “[t]herefore only stem cell lines which have been modified by in 
vitro treatments or genetically modified so that they have acquired characteristics for 
specific industrial application, fulfil the legal requirements for patentability.”  At the 
same time, with respect to isolated unmodified stem cells, it said at p. 15 that “. . . such 
isolated cells are so close to the human body, to the foetus or to the embryo they have 
been isolated from, that their patenting may be considered as a form of commercialisation 
of the human body.”  Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies, Ethical Aspects of Patenting Inventions Involving Human Stem Cells (May 
7, 2002), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/european_group_ethics/docs/avis16_en.pdf.  However, it has 
been argued that since isolation of stem cells results in modification, patents on isolated 
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Office, which is responsible for determining whether grounds exist for 
revoking a patent, read Rule 23d(c) broadly, dismissing the opinion of 
EGE, to preclude patents on “not only the industrial or commercial use of 
human embryos but also the human ES cells retrieved therefrom by 
destruction of human embryos.”273  It reasoned that without such a broad 
interpretation, Rule 23(d)(c) would be redundant given that Rule 23(e)(1) 
EPC prohibits patenting the human body at any stage of development.274  
The result was that the Edinburgh patent was upheld by the Opposition 
Division in an amended form that included modified human and animal 
stem cells other than embryonic stem cells.275   
 
[77]  Similarly, in the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (“WARF“) 
case, the EPO Examination Division excluded from patentability not only 
James Thomson’s process of isolating human embryos stem cells for 
industrial or commercial application but a human embryonic stem cell line 
when it necessarily involves the destruction of the human embryo from 
which the embryonic stem cells were derived.276  By contrast, adult stem 
cells, such as hematopoietic stem cells and stem cells derived from 
nonhuman animal embryos are not caught under Rule 23d(c) EPC.  
Technology can change, however, and it is now possible, in principle, to 
produce totipotent stem cells without the destruction of an embryo.277  
Since the WARF decision has been appealed to the Enlarged Patent Board 
of Appeals of the EPO, it remains to be seen whether Rule 23(d)(c) EPC 
forbids the patenting of human embryonic stem cell cultures when, at the 
filing date, such materials could be prepared solely by a method which 
                                                                                                                         
stem cells should not be excluded solely as a result of their isolated quality.  See Mats G. 
Hansson et al., Commentary: Isolated Stem Cells – Patentable as Cultural Artifacts?  25 
STEM CELLS 1507-510 (June 2007). 
273
 Decision of the Opposition Division of 21 July 2003 on European Patent No. 
EP0695351 (Univ. of Edinburgh), cited in Porter et al., supra note 260, at 653.  
274
 Id. at 653-54. 
275
 Id. 
276
 Id.; see also The Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys [(“CIPA], “), Patentability of 
Stem Cells in Europe, available at http://www.cipa.org.uk/pages/SCEurope. 
277
 For example, Advanced Cell Technology has discovered a method of producing stem 
cells that does not interfere with the developmental process of the embryo in mice.  In 
addition, it is now possible to produce biological material which will not develop into a 
fully developed organism but from which “embryonic” stem cells can be derived.  See 
Porter et al., supra note 260.  
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necessarily involved the destruction of the human embryos from which the 
stem cells were derived, if the method was not part of the claims.278    
 
[78]  Whatever the result of the WARF appeal may be, Article 5(1) of the 
Biotechnology Directive, prohibiting the patenting of human bodies at any 
stage of development, was itself interpreted by the Commission of the 
European Communities in 2005 to exclude human totipotent stem cells 
from patentability:     
 
The provisions of the Directive are clear in relation to 
[human] totipotent stem cells, since each cell could develop 
into a human being on its own and under Article 5(1) the 
human body at the various stages of its formation and 
development cannot constitute a patentable invention.279 
 
But, as Webber has pointed out, this interpretation raises the issue of how 
to reconcile the fact that isolated elements of the human body may 
constitute a patentable invention under Article 5(2) of the Biotechnology 
Directive with the fact that isolated totipotent stem cells are not patentable 
under Article 5(1) of the Biotechnology Directive.280  In fact, Webber 
maintains that elements which have been isolated from the human body or 
produced in a technical manner are not excluded from patentability.281 In 
his view, since human totipotent stem cells produced through human 
                                                 
278
 This is the question that the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO faces with respect 
to the WARF patent application.  See Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (T 
1374/04 - 3.3.08) (referral by the Technical Board of Appeal to the Enlarged Board of 
Appeal), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t041374ex1.htm. 
279
 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – 
Development and Implications of Patent Law in the Field of Biotechnology and Genetic 
Engineering (SEC(2005) 943), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_
doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2005&nu_doc=312.  For discussion, see Porter et al., supra 
note 260. 
280
 Phillip M. Webber, Patentability of Human Embryonic Cells under the EPC, BIO-SCI. 
L. REV., available at 
http://pharmalicensing.com/features/disp/1119630334_42bc33fe14906. 
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intervention are covered under Article 5(2) of the Biotechnology Directive, 
such cells are not excluded from patentability.282  
 
[79]  The prima facie difficulty facing Webber’s argument is that Article 
5(2) of the Biotechnology Directive is written in permissive form: it says 
that isolated elements of the human body may constitute patentable 
inventions, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a 
natural element; whereas Article 5(1) of the Biotechnology Directive is 
mandatory in form.283  The mandatory nature of Article 5(1) forbids 
patenting the human body at any stage of development.  The problem with 
this answer to Webber is that – even if it were correct – it does not 
satisfactorily settle the deeper question of whether 5(1) precludes the 
patentability of human stem cells that are not a natural stage of 
development of a human body, such as a fertilized egg produced through 
in vitro fertilization, parthenogenesis,284 or from non-embryonic totipotent 
stem cells isolated from post-natal connective tissue.285  It is arguable; 
furthermore, that no stem cell that has been extracted from an embryo is a 
natural stage of human development in any case, since it would not have 
developed into a mature human body on its own.  More generally, if 
Article 5(1) does prohibit the patenting of any isolated totipotent cells, 
then there is the further problem that it appears to imply that no human 
cells can be patented since almost all cells of a human body could, in the 
right environment, develop into a mature human whether after transfer of 
the cell nucleus into a human egg or, through technology that allows for 
the reprogramming of an adult human cell without nuclear transfer.286  
 
[80]  A further difficulty concerns the patentability of part-human organs 
suitable for transplantation. There are no provisions in either the 
                                                 
282
 Id. 
283
 “May” is ambiguous.  It could also be intended to mean that isolated elements of the 
human body shall not be regarded as unpatentable just because they are identical to 
natural elements.  
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 See, e.g., Chris Williams, Stem Cell Fraudster Made ‘Virgin Birth’ Breakthrough, 
THE REGISTER, Aug. 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/08/03/hwang_parthenogenesis/print.html. 
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 See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), Non-Embyonic 
Blastomere Like Totipotent Stem Cells, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/en/wo.jsp?wo=2006028723&IA=WO2006028723&DISPLA
Y=DESC (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). 
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 Takahashi K. et. al., supra note 52. 
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Biotechnology Directive or in Chapter VI of Implementing Regulations of 
the EPC that assist in determining the amount of human DNA that is 
necessary for part-human biological material, including stem cells, 
chimeras, cybrids, and stem cells extracted from cybrids to be considered 
to be human for the purposes of the EPC or the Biotechnology Directive.  
But in contrast to Canada and the United States, where there are no 
legislative prohibitions on the types of subject matter that are patentable 
based upon moral or public policy grounds, in Europe, the criteria for 
patentability expressly include exceptions based upon whether the 
publication or exploitation of the patent would be contrary to morality of 
public policy.  Thus, there is the possibility that general principles of 
morality or public policy could prevent the patenting of some kinds of 
part-human biological materials notwithstanding the absence of an explicit 
provision prohibiting those kinds of materials.  Article 53(a) of the EPC 
states: 
 
European patents shall not be granted in respect of:  
 
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which 
would be contrary to “ordre public” or morality, provided 
that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary 
merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some 
or all of the Contracting States; 287 
 
[81]  Despite the intended effect of this provisions – to prohibit patents on 
inventions where their publication or exploitation is immoral or against 
public policy – the EPO cases have interpreted Article 53(3)(a) in a 
manner that limits its effect.  The Harvard/Onco-mouse case held that 
                                                 
287
 European Patent Convention [EPC] art. 53(a), 1973, available at 
http://epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ar53.html; see also EPC, supra 
note 261.  The European approach is permitted under § 27(2) 2 of TRIPS, which allows 
members to exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of 
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality.  
See TRIPS, supra note 137.  Neither Canada nor the United States have legislated 
exceptions based upon those grounds.  In fact, in 1993, Canada repealed a prohibition 
against patenting “an invention that has an illicit object in view” and did not incorporate a 
blanket “ordre public or morality” even though the purpose of the statutory revision was 
to bring Canadian law into compliance with international agreements.   Id.  For 
discussion, see generally Harvard College, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 2002 SCC 76   ¶ 10 
(Can.).  
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whether 53(a) was a bar to patentability of a transgenic mouse depended 
mainly on whether the suffering of animals and possible risks to the 
environment outweighed the invention’s usefulness to mankind.288  
Howard Florey/Relaxin softened 53(3)(a) further, echoing The Guidelines 
for Examination of the EPO, by precluding patentability only when it is 
clear that “. . . it is probable that the public in general would regard the 
invention as so abhorrent that the grant of patent rights would be 
inconceivable.”289  
 
[82]  The subjective manner in which the Technical Board of Appeals of 
the EPO has interpreted the EPC morality provision has further blunted its 
impact. That is to say, the test is not whether in fact the publication or 
exploitation is contrary to morality but whether such actions are contrary 
to the morality and public policy that is recognized by European society as 
a whole.290  Given the contentious nature of patenting biological materials 
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 Harvard/Oncomouse, supra note 264 at s. 5.  Nevertheless, in the later WARF appeal, 
the Appeal Board said that it doubted that the weighing of interests test could apply to the 
“interests of human beings who could potentially benefit” against the interest of a human 
embryo to “get a life and of not being destroyed to benefit others.”  See Case T-1374/04, 
App. No. 96903521.1, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, Interlocutory Decision 
of the Technical Board of Appeal at ¶ 55, available at http://legal.european-patent-
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 Howard Florey/Relaxin [1995] EPO 388, at ¶ 6.2.1, available at http://legal.european-
patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/v940008ep1.htm. This finding echoes the Guidelines for 
Examination in the European Patent Office, Part C, Chapter IV, 4.1, which provides that 
“[a] fair test to apply is to consider whether it is probable that the public in general would 
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2003) available at 
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 According to the EPO Technical Board of Appeals:  
 
[t]he concept of morality is related to the belief that some behaviour is 
right and acceptable whereas other behaviour is wrong, this belief being 
founded on the totality of the accepted norms which are deeply rooted 
in a particular culture.  For the purposes of the EPC, the culture in 
question is the culture inherent in European society and civilization.  
Accordingly, under Art. 53(a) EPC, inventions the exploitation of 
which is not in conformity with the conventionally-accepted standards 
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containing human DNA and the difference in moral understanding and 
ordre public across diverse European cultures, it is unlikely that there will 
be a large measure of agreement on the issue of when biological material 
containing human DNA should be patented.  As the patentability of an 
invention in even one European country would establish the absence of a 
pan-European norm against patentability, it can be argued that if the 
commercial exploitation of an invention is not contrary to morality or 
public policy in at least one European country, it should be patentable by 
the EPO.291  Nevertheless, even if biotechnology patents are generously 
granted by the EPO, in this way they would be subject to revocation 
proceedings under national law.292  European countries have implemented 
into their national law Article 6(1) of the Biotechnology Directive, a 
virtually identical provision to Article 53(a) EPC, which provides that 
“inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial 
exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality; however, 
exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is 
prohibited by law or regulation.” 293    
 
[83]  Within European Union legislation, such as the Biotechnology 
Directive, there is a conscious use of open and vague concepts in order to 
provide a margin of appreciation for the Member States to achieve the 
transposition of Community Law into National Law at the expense of 
uniformity.294  Thus, it is possible for different national patent offices to 
interpret the Biotechnology Directive differently, reflecting national 
                                                                                                                         
of conduct pertaining to this culture are to be excluded from 
patentability as being contrary to morality.  
 
Further, “. . . the concept of ‘ordre public’ [public policy] covers the protection of public 
security and the physical integrity of individuals as part of society.”  Plant Genetics 
Systems, [1995] EPO 545, (T 356/93), available at http://legal.european-pagen-
office.org/dg3/biblio/t930356ex1.htm (approved by the Technical Board of Appeals at 
§10.2 of Harvard/Oncomouse  (T 315/03), available at http://legal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/biblio/t030315ex1.htm).  
291
 PLOMER, supra note 260, at 112-113.  
292
 PLOMER, supra note 260, at 113. 
293
 Biotechnology Directive, supra note 10, at Art. 6.1. 
294
 PLOMER, supra note 260, at 39 (citing M. DOUGAN, NATIONAL REMEDIES BEFORE THE 
COURT OF JUSTICE 143 (Hart Publishing 2004)). 
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difference in views of morality and public policy.295  For example, despite 
the EGE view that human pluripotent stem cells are not patentable, both 
Germany and Sweden, which have implemented the Biotechnology 
Directive, have granted patents on pluripotent stem cells.296  Similarly, the 
U.K. Intellectual Property Office in its Practice Notice on Inventions 
Involving Human Embryonic Stem Cells,297 takes the position that 
totipotent human stem cells are not patentable because they have the 
potential to develop into an entire human body.298  At the same time, it is 
not contrary to morality or public policy to patent pluripotent human stem 
cells because, while they do not have the potential of totipotent stem cells, 
stem cell research does promise to provide new treatments for a wide 
range of serious diseases.299 In fact, the U.K. has filed an Amicus Curiae 
submission to the Enlarged Board of Appeals of the EPO in relation to 
WARF arguing that, among other things, Rule 23d(c) does not prevent the 
patenting of claims directed to embryonic stem cell cultures.300  
 
[84]  Given the difficulty of arriving at a uniform and principled answer to 
whether part-human bodies can be patented in Europe as a whole, how 
difficult would it be to replace the prohibition against patenting human 
bodies with one prohibiting the patenting of persons?  Legislation in 
Europe is decidedly ambiguous about whether humans or persons have a 
better claim to legal standing.  As has been discussed, the value of the 
biological human is reflected in the Biotechnology Directive which 
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 Indeed, national variations in patent decision-making are likely to be upheld since, 
notwithstanding that the European Court of Justice can be seized of jurisdiction to 
interpret European Treaties in a uniform way, recital 39 of the Biotechnology Directive  
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 See PLOMER, supra note 260, at 30. 
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prohibits patenting the human body at the various stages of its formation 
and development – regardless of whether the human body is the body of a 
person.301  The Biomedicine Convention also reflects “the need to respect 
the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human 
species and recognising the importance of ensuring the dignity of the 
human being.”302  The Explanatory Report to the Biomedicine Convention 
provides that it was a generally accepted principle that “human dignity and 
the identity of the human being had to be respected as soon as life 
began.”303  At the same time, most of the provisions embodied in the 
European Convention on Human Rights304 and some provisions of the 
Biotechnology Directive support the idea that persons are of greater 
concern morally than are humans per se.  The European Convention on 
Human Rights states, for instance, that “[e]veryone has the right to liberty 
and security of person.”305  The Biotechnology Directive provides that “. . . 
patent law must be applied so as to respect the fundamental principles 
safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person.”306  While a uniform 
change in law would be very difficult at the European level, at the national 
level there may be more latitude for changes in patentability criteria as 
European countries are afforded a margin of interpretation to “. . . take 
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 Biotechnology Directive, supra note 10 at Art. 5. 
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 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
Regard the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
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account of the particular difficulties to which the use of certain patents 
may give rise in the social and cultural context of each Member State.”307 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
[85]  The use of part-human materials for research and transplantation has 
the potential to significantly alleviate human suffering.  In Canada, the 
United States, and Europe, a rule exists forbidding the patenting of human 
beings.  Because of the vagueness of this rule, its application is highly 
indeterminate and, therefore, has led to differing results in distinct 
jurisdictions.  The USPTO has said that it cannot determine how much 
human DNA is necessary for something to be considered human. 
Although humans at any stage of development are not patentable in the 
United States, human totipotent stem cells – which could develop into 
mature humans – appear to be patentable.  In Europe, the lack of moral 
consensus makes it unlikely that there would be a prohibition by the EPO 
of patents on animal-human combinations per se.  Nevertheless, as in the 
United States, there is an indeterminacy regarding the amount of human 
DNA required to make animal-human combinations unpatentable.  
Despite the fact that totipotent stem cells appear to be patentable in the 
United States, human totipotent stem cells have been deemed to be 
unpatentable in Europe by the EPO and by some countries, such as the 
U.K.  In Canada, based upon patentability criteria virtually identical to that 
of the U.S., the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that higher life forms, 
including humans, are unpatentable.  This implies that no animal-human 
combinations or their parts – such as tissues and organs – are patentable.  
Finally, although the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated in obiter 
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dicta that fertilized eggs of a mouse are patentable, CIPO has adopted a 
rule that neither fertilized eggs nor totipotent stem cells of animals are 
patentable.   
 
[86]  Short of eliminating patentability rules that depend upon fine 
distinctions between various kinds of subject matter, one solution to the 
problems raised by the use of biological criteria for patentability is to 
replace the rule against patenting humans and higher life forms with a rule 
that forbids the patenting of persons whether human or not.  This is 
consistent with the ethical view that persons are the proper subject of 
rights rather than humans per se.  A rule against patenting persons rather 
than one against patenting humans would replace biological criteria with 
non-biological criteria and result in a broader scope of patentable part-
human materials that are useful for transplantation.  However, significant 
obstacles exist to modifying the rule that prohibits the patenting of humans 
to one that prohibits the patenting of human persons in the patent law of 
the United States, Canada and Europe.    
 
[87]  In the United States, there is no sign that Congress would be 
prepared to adopt a rule prohibiting the patenting of persons.  In Canada, 
the Supreme Court of Canada could strike down CIPO’s interpretation of 
the Supreme Court of Canada that fertilized eggs and totipotent stem cells 
are higher life forms if only because it contradicts obiter dicta of the 
Supreme Court.  However, in terms of animal-human combinations, while 
the Supreme Court of Canada, in obiter dicta, expressed openness to 
allowing patents on part-human organs and tissues used for 
transplantation, it has been unprepared to interfere with the CIPO’s 
distinction between higher and lower life forms, preferring that the 
Canadian Parliament intervene.  There is no indication, moreover, that 
Canadian Parliament is willing to intervene in matters of biotechnology 
patentability.  In Europe, the difficulty of enacting the Biotechnology 
Directive would likely preclude re-opening it to substitute a rule against 
patenting persons for the present rule concerning human bodies.  At a 
national level, however, there is latitude for implementing the 
Biotechnology Directive in accordance with national norms which might 
allow for greater scope in patenting animal-human combinations than at 
the EPO level.  However, it would be difficult to interpret the explicit 
provision prohibiting the patenting of human bodies at any stage of 
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development in the Biotechnology Directive as prohibiting the patenting of 
persons instead. 
